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This thesis sets out to further reveal the technology and time interrelationship in
human society. It is through an investigation of an array of sociological, theoretical,
philosophical, historical and artistic responses to modernity that this relationship is
explored.

Primary analytic focus is placed on two contemporary authors who have

addressed the technology and time relationship. These authors are Manuel Castells and
Paul Virilio. Castells and Virilio offer two distinct portraits of the modem-technological
world.

By contrasting these authors' projects, methods and intellectual heritage, the

question of technology and time is further scrutinized. Advanced here is an argument
that time is an essential dimension of social life deserving of greater attention within
sociology and related fields. Correspondingly, the role of technology in relation to
human understanding of time cannot be ignored. Additionally, it is held that in order to
sufficiently address technology and time as social phenomena, a step beyond timeless
causal analysis need be made. It is argued that sociology might be served rather than de
legitimated by the incorporation of a world-historical outlook and a consideration of
metaphysics, human being, will and destiny.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
This thesis is about technology and time. Technology and time are two infinitely
broad topics, each possessing multiple levels of meaning. As a sociological thesis, the
topics of technology and time are imagined here not as natural or physical phenomena,
but rather as social phenomena. In thinking of technology and time as social things, we
set aside the role of technical engineer or physicist who might study their natural or
physical properties, and instead look to the presence and impact of these phenomena
within human society. Time, as a social phenomenon, is thought of here both in terms of
experienced duration, where "our time" signifies the available now, and in terms of
history, where "our time" signifies the era in which we live.
Technology will remain largely undefined throughout this thesis. In an absolute
sense, this is the thesis question.
distinguished here.

However, two images of technology might be

Technology is thought of both in terms of its material

(actual/physical technologies) and cultural (institutions, practices and beliefs)
representations within society.
Presented over the following pages is an attempt to address an admittedly broad
question, an unanswerable question perhaps. More specifically, the question of interest
relates to a hypothesized phenomenon of "time-compression" which is believed to be
brought on by certain modem technologies. This phenomenon is envisaged through a
theoretical and historical perspective. The method and approach of this thesis is less

counter-action to perceived sociological trends than representative of its author's
preferred method of investigating social things.
Foremost, it is the purpose of this thesis to synthesize an array of empirical and
theoretical writings on technology and time. In providing an analytic foundation, two
contemporary authors concerned with the question(s) of technology and time are
compared; these authors are Manuel Castells and Paul Virilio. Chapter 2 serves well as
an introduction to their background and work. The comparison and contrast of Castells
and Virilio provides the analytic grounds from which this thesis develops.

Several

related inquires stem from these grounds, but never so far as to disconnect or lose a sense
of cohesive statement; a statement which should be clear before the end.
Following this introductory chapter is an overview of Castells' and Virilio's work.
Chapter 2 outlines the key ideas and themes from Castells' and Virilio's writings and
provides the foundation from which the rest of this project stems. Accordingly, the rest
of this thesis will work to uproot some of the assumptions and implications of Castells'
and Virilio's arguments related to technology, time, and time-compression.
Chapter 3 consists of a review of some of the time literature found specifically
within sociology. In reviewing this literature, one finds however (as we will see) that the
accounts of time found even specifically within sociology cross many disciplinary lines.
A brief review of some recent sociological studies of technology and time as a combined
phenomenon are included in Chapter 3 as well. Within chapter 4, a deeper examination
of Castells' and Virilio's intellectual heritage is presented; this, in order to further unravel
these authors' projects, where some of their basic assumptions and arguments related to
technology and time are addressed. Chapter 5 is a presentation of some of the actual
technologies suspected of having an impact on social time, both historically and present2

day. Castells and Virilio are again the spotlights of this chapter, but a few chronological
stops are made before getting to their accounts. In assessing some of the monumental
technological developments taking place at the tum of the 20th century, we tum to the
work of Stephen Kem. In addition to an examination of some of actual time influencing
technologies, the time (era) of technology is also more closely scrutinized. The era of
"modernity" is highlighted.

Just as technology is not so easily defined, neither is

modernity or its origins. Presented within chapter 5 is a world-historical perspective on
modernity and technology. A world-historical perspective is offered in an effort to place
technology and modernity within a far-reaching historical context and frame of reference.
An emphasis is placed on the historical evolution of technology, with various authors
weighing in on the matter.

Through Castells' and Virilio's identification of some

present-day technologies, the hypothesized technology and time relationship is further
extended.

In the final chapter an effort is made to pull everything back together while

bringing forth a cohesive and uniform thesis statement.

Chapter 6 provides this

statement.
While attempting to address a far-reaching research question, it is an auxiliary
intent of this thesis to argue that only through a far-reaching, world-historical perspective
might a research question of this nature be sufficiently addressed. What remains to be
established is whether or not a research question of this nature resides inside or outside
the scope of sociology. Reflecting first on a statement made by Heidegger: "I am not
against technology. I have never spoken against technology, also not against the so
called demonic [nature] of technology. But instead I attempt: to understand the essence
[Wesen] of technology" (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 19). It might be added that the following
is a critique of technology, not a rant against it. Is it beyond the scope of sociology, even
3

a theoretical sociology, to attempt to understand the essence of technology? Might such a
far-reaching question be better suited for philosophy?
The epistemological aims of sociology have long separated it from philosophy.
Sociology acquires its knowledge from the observable, the empirically measurable, not
from speculative reflection. Therefore, a rigorously positive sociology remains bounded
by the maxim: if it is not observable, it does not exist. (Or at least it is not the concern of
a scientific sociology; such matters are left to the domains of philosophy, theology,
mythology and the other mystical realms.) From the start, sociology has embarked upon
its own sort of separation of church and state, siding clearly on the side of the secular.
Secularization a clear trend of an instrumental and rational modernity. Sociology, even
in offering refuge for various political undertakings, where the flags of class, race and
gender are often waved, has itself largely operated as an instrumental-rational endeavor.
The mainstream objective of sociology for the most part is the orderly gathering and
presentation of qualitative and/or quantitative data.
An auxiliary purpose of this thesis is to argue that sociology might be served
rather than de-legitimated by the incorporation of world-history and philosophy into its
investigations. Further, it is argued that placeless, timeless, and beingless social analysis
rests on next to nothing. The argument presented here is that social things do not always
follow the same laws as natural things. Simply, that there may be more at work within
human affairs than blind causality.

Certainly, the research question of interest will

largely determine the extent of this. Some sociological questions lend themselves well to
a natural/causal approach. Further support for these statements is provided throughout the
following chapters.

4

In asking the question of technology and time from an expansive world-historical
perspective, it is likewise suggested that while studying social things, it is important to at
least take into consideration what it means to be in a human and social sense. These are
two dimensions of social life that may very well exceed the rational bounds of certain
strains of scientific sociology; particularly those strains that emphasize placeless and
timeless causality as the centerpiece of social research and a legitimate sociology. These
themes will be returned to throughout this thesis, as the bounds of sociology are at the
same time are explored.

5

CHAPTER II
AN OVERVIEW OF CASTELLS AND VIRILIO
Oh no,what horror,what new plot,
new agony this?it' s growing,massing,deep in the house,
a plot,a monstrous - thing
to crush the loved ones,no,
there is no cure, and rescue's far away...
- Aeschylus,Agamemnon ll. 1100-1105
Greek antiquity had Cassandra, its prophetess of doom whose warnings fell on
deaf ears. The twenty-first century may have two of its own Cassandras in Manuel
Castells and Paul Virilio. Castells, a sociologist, and Virilio, a "critic of the art of
technology," - neither a "postmodernist" - have raised some eyebrows with their
dramatic claims on the state of the social world, past, present and future. For example,
Castells insists that we are experiencing an unprecedented break from past forms of
society, a break characterized in starkly negative fashion. The result: a new global
socio-economic structure centered on information capitalism, which he coins the
"Network Society." Virilio is even more catastrophic, he asserts that the human world
now exists in a condition of "Pure War "; a state of deterrence based upon nuclear threat,
where civilians are soldiers and global cataclysm is only a conflict away. Might we take
these warnings seriously, or discredit their orators as doomsayers?
The point of this review is to take these warnings seriously. While Castells and
Virilio may not be exemplars of either the sociology or cultural theory cannons, their
technology-based writings have brought them considerable recognition. In fact, Castells
6

and Virilio may well be two of the most forward-looking authors working on "the riddle
of technology" today. So let us inquire further.
Some of the general themes from Castells' and Virilio's work will be compared in
this inquiry. An effort will be made to demonstrate these authors' seeming similarities as
well as their substantial differences. This comparison is important not only because
Castells and Virilio are significant technology theorists, but also because they employ
different perspectives and methods in assessing modem society. To be compared are the
backgrounds, methods, and general projects of Castells and Virilio. In addition to this
comparison, there will be a brief concluding section on ways of knowing in relation to
these authors' work.
An effort will be made to show where Castells and Virilio's projects seem to have
similarities. Many of these similarities begin to fade, however, upon closer examination.
These authors exhibit distinct portraits of the modem world.

An area of seeming

similarity can be found in Castells' and Virilio's discussion of time.

Both authors

incorporate into their broader projects a directed effort to reveal the nature of social time,
and both speak of a condition of "time-compression" in modem society. Of course, the
idea of time-compression (in a social rather than physical sense) is open to debate. In
many ways, the notion of time is the conceptual summit of Castells' and Virilio's work.
That is, the rest of their projects seem to provide the basis for their understandings of
time. Therefore, to fully evaluate these authors' discussions of time, we need to know
something about their broader projects.

7

Backgrounds
In an attempt to show where Castells and Virilio are located on the intellectual
map, their influences and backgrounds will be outlined here. This section is intended to
be brief, without any in-depth analysis.

Instead, just a preliminary sketch of these

authors' influences will be presented.
Castells' Background
Starting with Castells, he has been described by Bromley (1999) as someone who
has come a long way from "his former Althusserian Marxist self' (p. 13). In his major
work, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Castells lists some of his
influences as being David Harvey, Scott Lash, Daniel Bell, as well as "the one Marxist
theorist who sensed the new, relevant issues just before his death in 1979, Nicos
Poulantzas" (1996, p. 26). In accordance with his general approach, Castells might be
placed among the post-Marxists. But as Calabrese (1999) says: " ... one gets the strong
sense that Castells is struggling with his ambivalent declaration of membership in the
community of 'former Marxists"' (p. 7). In addition, Castells' analysis of the network
society has been depicted as "resolutely materialist" by Bromely, despite the concern
with culture and identity in his work. Still dealing with influences, and on the topic of
time, Castells footnotes Giddens, Adam, Lash and Urry, and even makes mention of
Durkheim, Sorokin and Merton. But, as will be argued in further detail later, application
of these theorists' ideas is scarce. Castells' discussion of time is clearly given form by
David Harvey, as will be shown in subsequent sections.

Another influence upon

Castells' work is Alain Touraine, who informs his ideas on informationalism along with
8

Bell (Castells, 1996).
Castells (1996) makes a pronounced statement that even though he deals in topics
often associated with post-(structuralism/modernism/fill in the blank), he is not working
from a postmodernist perspective:

"Similarly, I shall not contribute, except when

necessary for the sake of argument, to the cottage industry created in the 1980s around
postmodern theory" (p. 26). It would seem that Castells' might dedicate a large portion of
his work to theory given his referencing of all of the theory minded authors above, but
this would be mistaken, as will be argued.
Virilio's Background
Turning now to Virilio, what will be made evident throughout this review is that
he defies precise definition.

This may be construed as either a good or bad thing.

Through his style and method Virilio certainly leaves himself open to a great deal of
criticism.

Virilio is in a peculiar intellectual position largely because of his varied

biography, which does not include a career in the social sciences. While biographies are
usually more sidetrack than substantive, Virilio's is rather relevant. Born in Paris, Virilio
is a self described "Blitzkrieg baby." Virilio was evacuated in 1939 from his home
during WWII, and he tells he was confronted by the speed of war at an early age: "As a
child I was terrorized by war" (1997, p. 30). Later to be drafted into the French- Algerian
war, Virilio says of his war-ridden past: "it's tragic" (1997, p 30).
In a strange synthesis of art and war, Virilio started his career as an artist in
stained glass, where he worked alongside Matisse. As an untrained architect until 1968,
his earliest writings were dedicated to the philosophical study of war architecture.
Bunker Archeology (1975) was his first major work. If this biography is not already odd
9

enough, Virilio also studied phenomenology with Merleau-Ponty at the Sorbonne. Prior
to all of this, he converted to Christianity in 1950 and identifies himself now as an
"anarcho-Christian" (Armitage, 2002). While Virilio was nominated Professor by the
students at the Ecole Speciale d'Architecture, and despite his involvement with Jacques
Derrida in founding the International College of Philosophy, Virilio lacks credibility in
the academic world, and he is conscientious of this himself:
And since, to boot, I don't have a career in the social sciences - sociology
of war, history of technology, etc. - to back me up, people have their
doubts about me . . . Thus I'm either grouped in with a mystifying,
mystical logic- defrocked priest- or with a military logic- defrocked officer
(1983, p. 30).
Irrespective of his acquaintance with Derrida, Armitage (2002) explains that there
1s no connection between Virilio's thought and that of the deconstructionist and
poststructuralist theorists, nor does his work have much to do with the "postmodernists"
such as Baudrillard or Lyotard. Rather, Virilio has his foundation in phenomenology and
existentialism. He is a devout anti-Marixist. As a practicing Christian and humanist,
Virilio is repulsed by Nietzsche's nihilism, this while he admires the "operatic part of
Nietzsche" (Armitage 2002). Virilio dedicates his work to making sense of history, and
his reference points are largely "modernist." Armitage (1999) summarizes well Virilio's
general perspective:
Virilio's cultural theory draws extensively on the modernist tradition in
the arts and science. In it, Virilio constantly references modernist writers
such as Kafka and Aldous Huxley, and modernist artists like Marinetti and
Duchamp. His most consistent philosophical reference points are Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty, phenomenologists and modernists. Furthermore,
Virilio's later writings regularly cite Einstein's works on relativity theory
and quantum mechanics. Here, then, are clear instances of Virilio's broad
commitment to the philosophy of scientific modernism established in the
early part of the 20th century (p. 7).
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Methods
This section on methods is also intended to be brief. The purpose here is not to
double-check Castells' data on the "shares of major Latin American countries in world
exports" (1996, p. 124), but rather to provide a base understanding of how Castells and
Virilio make their observations and how they come to their conclusions.
Castells' Method
Manuel Castells is a sociologist, a sociologist's sociologist in fact. Empiricism
dominates his method. "We need proof!" we might hear him scream, and he does: "The
renewal of the study of society cannot proceed just on theoretical grounds. Sociology is
an empirical science" (Castells, 2000a, p. 5).

Much as Durkheim sought to craft

sociology as an autonomous, self contained, scientific discipline, so does Castells:
"Because we need to know, and because people need to know, more than ever we need a
sociology rooted in its scientific endeavor" (2000a, p. 1). Castells persuades that in these
times of "multidimensional social change," people the world over need sociology.
Castells further clarifies: "but not just any kind of sociology"; he concludes that "without
a consensus on sociology as science-indeed, as a specific social science - we sociologists
will fail in our professional and intellectual duty at a time when we are needed most"
(2000, p. 1).

Why are we needed?

Castells replies: "We are needed because,

individually and collectively, most people in the world are lost about the meaning of the
whirlwind we are going through" (2000a, p. l). He further instructs:
We are needed because as would-be scientists of society we are positioned
better than anyone else to produce knowledge about the new society, and
to be credible - or at least more credible than the futurologists and
ideologues that litter the interpretation of current historical changes, let
alone politicians always jumping on the latest trendy word (2000a, p. 1).
11

Methodologically, Castells seems quite certain about the shape of the new
sociology: it must be scientific. In practicing what he preaches, Castells employs a
variety of empirical methods in his major work The Information Age. He states that he
uses a significant amount of statistical sources, and that he tends to use data sources that
find "broad, accepted consensus among social scientists (for example, OECD, United
Nations, World Bank, governments' official statistics, authoritative research monographs,
generally reliable academic or business sources)" (Castells, 1996, p. 26). Castells is
positive about the new sociology's future:
Overall, sociology should, and will overcome the sterile, artificial
opposition between quantitative and qualitative research, and between
theory and empirical study. In the perspective of computational literacy
networks, it does not really matter what comes from statistics or from
ethnography. What matters is the accuracy of the observation, and its
meaning (2000a, p. 6).
Virilio's Method
Virilio, conversely, has a slightly different take on these matters and sociology in
general:
People often tell me: you reason in a political way, like the Ancients. It's
true. I don't believe in sociology. It's a mask. Sociology was invented in
order to forget politics. For me, all that is social, sociological, doesn't
interest me. I prefer politics and war (1997a, p. 17).
These harsh words from Virilio might almost sound reminiscent of the critical
conflict perspective in sociology - with its assertion that social science cannot be an
objective science, but only a value positioned endeavor. This interpretation would not be
too far off the mark. However, it is important to remember that Virilio is in no way a
Marxist, nor is he coming out from this general background. He is approaching things
from an all-together different vantage point. To take offense to these comments or to
12

read Virilio with sociological blinders on may be to miss much of what he is saying.
Considering this passage:
I don't have much use for sociological analysis. Moreover, it doesn't
seem very well founded, whereas we could find a connection between the
myths of Indo-European tripartition and those of contemporary sociology.
I'm thinking of Roland Barthes: sociology as mythology (1997a, p. 21).
What is apparent is that Virilio's method is not easily summarized, at least not
coherently or to its full extent. A question and answer passage from Virilio's book Pure
War (1997a) is helpful in revealing to some degree Virilio's general approach toward

social analysis. The question below comes from Sylvere Lotringer:
Lotringer: You reject sociological analysis, but in its place you put a
mythological model, the structure of the three ''functions" (sacred,
military, and economic) established by Georges Dumezil through the
collective representations of Inda-European society. Inda-European
tripartition is a mythical projection more than a historical reality. What
allows us to accord it an analytical capacity greater than that of
contemporary sociology?
Virilio: Myths have an analytical capacity that cannot be denied. By
comparison sociology seems a surface effect. What interests me is
tendency. As Churchill wrote: "In ancient warfare, the episodes were
more important than the tendencies; in modem warfare, the tendencies are
more important than the episodes." Myth is tendency. The three functions
thus seem to me analyzers of the knowledge of war, political knowledge,
achieving infinitely more than all the successive sociological macro- or
micro- developments. Of course a tendency is not a reality, it's a statistical
vision. The myth as analyzer and as tendency is itself also of a statistical
order (1997, pp. 19-20).
How are we to respond to this sociological sacrilege? Can this be science? Yet
before we cast Virilio off as mythological, we should be aware of his frequent application
of physical and technical science in his work; Einstein often appears. Also, we need to
remember his ontological and methodological ties to phenomenology. Phenomenology
itself, according to its founder Husserl, was to be a science of phenomena.

Later

phenomenological thinkers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, two of Virilio's clear
13

influences, also took up phenomenology as a science. Yet, what sort of science are we
talking about here? We should be aware of the tendency in phenomenology to oppose
objectivism and positivism in favor of "encountering." Still, they reject grand systems of
speculative thinking preferring to deal with observable matters. Merleau-Ponty is known
for opening the path of phenomenology into politics, perception, history, language and
art. In reading Virilio, with his constant merging of real world events, art, and history in
his arguments, what is clear is that he learned this lesson well from Merleau-Ponty.
However, in considering Merleau-Ponty's sociological ties, Virilio's position on
sociology may seem a bit out of place. Clearly Virilio has not taken on all of Merleau
Ponty's teaching, and is still in many ways a theorist of another sort.
Or is this methodological matter simply one of sociologist versus philosopher? If
sociology might be distinguished from philosophy by its empirical requirements for
establishing knowledge, and from other sciences by its unique explanans (explanation) of
explanandum (that which is explained), then Virilio is without question more sociologist
than philosopher. Yes, as will be shown, Virilio has a deep philosophical background
and understanding, but he deals with real observations of real events, contemporary and
historical. He employs a method that makes use of the obvious quality of the implicit.
His accounts and arguments are enmeshed with facts, social facts even. So where might
we place the methods of Virilio?

He verbally rejects sociology.

However, he is

obviously dealing in social things, not merely metaphysical meanderings.
With these considerations on method made, we see dramatic differences in style
and attitude on the proper mode of gaining social knowledge. So dramatic are these
differences that we are left to ask; is it possible for both of these methods to be
sociological? What is sociology? And even more broadly, what is science? Not that
14

such big questions might be answered here, but they are still important to ask in relation
to Castells' and Virilio's work. A later section on ways of knowing will take up these
questions once more.
Projects
The general themes from Castells' and Virilio's projects will be outlined in this
section in order to preface their ideas on time. Once again, the intent here is not to
completely unravel the influences and premises of Castells' and Virilio's work, but to set
the way for a more complete discussion of their ideas on time.
Castells' Project
In speaking of Castells' project, what is being referred to is his general view on
modem society as presented in his major work, The Information Age: Economy, Society
and Culture, as well as his related commentaries. The entirety of Castells' argument rests
on a single and central premise: that we are in a new society. This new society is thought
to be the product of changes taking place during the late 1960s and 1970s.
In his project, Castells characterizes three separate and distinct social processes he
believes coincided in time. They are: (1) the revolution in information technology;, (2)
the economic restructuring of capitalism and statism, and (3) the rise of cultural social
movements, all taking place in the 1960s and 1970s.
developments gave rise to a new form of society.
"network society."

Castells believes that these

This new society he terms the

In Castells' model, the network society has its ongms as an

emerging socio-economic structure of informational capitalism. This structure's mode of
production is capitalist, and its technological system informational. Bromely (1999)
15

states that Castells' work can be read as an attempt to integrate the insights of Marxist
theory with the work of post-industrial theorists such as Daniel Bell and Alain Touraine.
What needs to be emphasized is Castells' insistence that the new global economy is
capitalist as well as informational. Castells' notion of a large and intertwined network
society depends upon a medium of interconnection. This medium of interconnection is
the new information technologies, which Castells believes started to emerge in the 1970s.
Castells bases this understanding on a historical model that shows similarities
with that of Marx. Castells contends that there have been three modes of historical
development:

agrarian, industrial, and informational (which would appear to be

implicitly distinct from each other). The informational stage (1970s) is considered to be
the stage that distinguishes the new era of capitalism from the previous eras of capitalism.
According to Castells, new forms of computer-mediated communication and media
typify the informational stage.Castells adds:
This networking capability only became possible, naturally, because of
major developments both in telecommunication and computer networking
technologies during the 1970s. But, at the same time, such changes were
only made possible by new microelectronic devices and stepped-up
computing capacity, in a striking illustration of the synergistic
relationships in the Information Technology Revolution (1996, p.45)
With this emphasis on the networking capability brought about by new
technologies, Castells seeks to draw out another point that he believes follows from the
logic of the network: that the network is increasingly overtaking the social world through
its all-encompassing logic and nature:
Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the
diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and
outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture ...
Further more I would argue that this networking logic induces a social
determination of a higher level than that of the specific social interests
expressed through the networks: the power of the flows takes precedence
16

over the flows of power (1996, p. 469).
Reflecting on what Castells is saying here, he appears to be declaring that the
network is gaining a power of its own, a seemingly autonomous power from those who
may have their interests in it (under the capitalist mode). Van Dijk (1999) says that
Castells:
moves to the conclusion that power is no longer concentrated in
institutions (the state), organizations (capitalist firms), or symbolic
controllers (corporate media, churches). It is diffused in global networks
of wealth, power, information and images, which circulate and transmute
in a system of variable geometry and dematerialized geography (p. 130).
In Castells model, the "space of places," which has been the fundamental order of
industrial society, has been replaced by the "space of flows" (Wilenius, 1998, p. 270).
Castells clarifies on the "space of flows": "The space of flows is not placeless, although
its structural logic is. It is based on an electronic network, but this network links up
specific

places,

with

well-defined

social,

cultural,

physical,

and

functional

characteristics" (1996, p. 413).
This general argument, that real places are losing significance with the growth of
global communication technologies, can be found in the work of a growing number of
globalization and technology theorists. Giddens (1984) has raised similar concerns, and
as we will see, Virilio seems comparable on these matters as well. But it will be argued
that there remain differences between Virilio's and Castells' understandings of these
matters.
Of further importance with this discussion of places, geography, and flows in
Castells network model is the influence of David Harvey. Harvey's work will be shown
to have a direct influence on Castells' perspective on capitalism, place, and time.

•
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Virilio's Project
Vi1ilio's project cannot be as easily pinpointed as can Castells'. Virilio does not
have one or two major works, but a series of treatises. This too might be considered a
methodological difference; Virilio writes in short spurts, vignettes. What cannot be
emphasized enough here is how different the styles of Castells and Virilio are. But
beyond stylistic differences, there are differences in historical understanding and
worldview. While Castells dedicates some attention to the historical development of
technology, he largely fails to relate the significance of these developments to his model
of the network society. His analysis starts in the 1970s (the proposed birthing time of the
new society), negating much of his historical review.
Virilio's historical understanding includes a much longer span of time than does
Castells'. Virilio frequently relays stories from the Greeks, and his perspective makes
use of the earliest records of social history. For the sake of focus, only a sketch of
Virilio's broader project will be presented here. All of what follows is believed to relate
and lead up to Virilio's ideas on time; if this is at first unclear, it should become more
clear as this discussion develops.
War is the centerpiece of Virilio's project. Frequently military theoretician Von
Clausewitz is referenced in Virilio's work, but it is Sun Tzu and his ancient Chinese text,
The Art of Wa,r that Virilio admits to having learned the most from. "Speed is the
essence of war," states Sun Tzu - a maxim Virilio has spent more than twenty years
attempting to refine. Interestingly, Castells also makes brief mention of Sun Tzu, and in
places he includes war as a topic of discussion, but these limited treatments do not direct
or shape his broader project in any meaningful way. The centrality of Castells' work
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remams econorruc, this too within a "post-Marxian" framework of analysis.

Before

returning to the idea of speed in greater depth, let us first outline some of the basics of
Virilio's war model of society.
Virilio's thinking is tied inescapably to a historically broad view, one that begins
with the first human civilizations: "In the first Hellenic democracy we already find most
of the great Western themes, except for the main one: mobility" (1986, p. 66). The
notion of mobility is an important one in relation to speed, as well as the city. Whereas
many historians (economists, sociologists, etc.) conceive of the city as a marketplace, and
as having its origins as a marketplace and location of trade and barter, Virilio offers us
another explanation. According to Virilio, the city has military origins. Virilio identifies
the fortified city as a key and significant feature in the development of human
civilizations:
The guarantee of urban franchises is first and foremost the reorganization
of the old Gallo-Roman site following the layout of the fortified castle, the
construction of those impregnable fortresses that had nothing to fear from
the war machines then in use, but everything to fear, at every moment,
form surprises and strategems come from without, from afar, with the
nomadic masses (1986, pp. 9-10)
Tracing human history, Virilio shows that the city was first a place of refuge and
defense: "The fortified enclosure of the Middle Ages creates an artificial field, makes
this field a stage on which physical and psychological constraints can be imposed" (1986,
p. 10). The early formation of the city would also take on class dimensions, as is argued
below:
The bourgeoisie will get its initial power and class characteristics (which,
of course, were not at all peculiar to them; we all know the capital role
played by monasticism, chivalry, etc., in the areas of banking, industry . .
.) less from commerce and industry than from the strategic implantation
that establishes the ''fixed domicile" as a social and monetary value from real estate speculation as the sale and trading of fixed property, the
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right to reside within the ramparts of fortified cities, the right to security
and preservation within the perilous migration of a world of pilgrims,
barges, soldiers and exiles moving onward by the millions (1986, p.9)
Virilio states plainly: "Bourgeois power is military even more than economic"
(1986, p. 11). The war model presented by Virilio interprets the growth of the modem
city as one of the primary sources of power for the bourgeois, or elite classes. The
fortified city was the stronghold of the feudal period, a stationary "war machine" with the
capabilities to "modulate the circulation and the momentum of the movements of the
urban masses" (Armitage, 2002, p. 2). What follows from this is that the fortified city
would also become a political space and a place of politics during the feudal era.
While it may seem a stretch upon first consideration, Virilio also argues that
speed is intrinsically tied to all of this. Speed is linked to military power (as pointed out
by Sun Tzu), the formation of the modem city, and politics. Virilio is hailed as the
inventor of the concept "Dromology," which comes from the Greek dramas, or race.
Dromology as a concept means more, however, than just speed; it involves ideas of
distance, space, time, and as we see in this passage, politics:
Speed is the unknown side of politics, and has been since the beginning;
this is nothing new. The wealth aspect in politics was spotlighted a long
time ago. Now, it was a mistake - which I'm modestly trying to correct to forget that wealth is an aspect of speed ... .Every society is
dromocratic . . .. It's not by chance that ancient society was one of
successive obstacles on the level of people, of morals, of territorial
definition - whether it was the city walls, taxes, the fortified systems of
the Nation-State: all of them were so many brakes. Then, suddenly, there's
the great revolution that others have called the Industrial Revolution or the
Transportation Revolution. I call it a dromocratic revolution because what
was invented was not only...the possibility of multiplying similar objects
(which to my mind is a completely limited vision), but especially a means
of fabricating speed with the steam engine, then the combustion engine.
And so they can pass from the age of brakes to the age of the accelerator
(1997a, pp.49-51).
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Virilio's emphasis on speed and dromology does not negate economics or
econoIDic processes, however.

He simply suggests that in addition to the political

economy of wealth, there must also be a political economy of speed. By revealing the
histories of sociopolitical institutions like the military, and by reviewing artistic
movements such as Futurism (Marinetti and company), Virilio demonstrates that war and
the need for speed are at the foundations of society; as much or more so than commerce
or the urge for wealth (Arimitage, 2001, p. 218). Virilio offers an interesting set of
historical facts to support the notion that commerce did not need the city, but that
increasingly a successful war campaign did:
The first marketplace was the beach. The Phoenicians pass by in boats
(same thing for caravans), they leave an object on the beach, and later they
come back to see if anyone has taken it, if anyone has put something else
in its place. That's what commerce is: "the caravan passes." This still
exists: someone puts a jug of milk on the side of the road and takes off;
later he comes back to pick up the money. If there is no money, the jug of
milk isn't brought back ... Commerce comes after the arrival of war in a
place, the state of siege, the organization of a glacis around an inhabited
area, etc. It doesn't need the city- the city in the sense of
sedentariness...(1986, p.12).
As will be shown further in the following section, the war model of society and
dromology are at the base of Virilio's thinking. These concepts are directly related to his
conceptions of time and modem society.
On Time
Both Castells and Virilio make claims revolving around the idea/notion of "time
compression."

Both consider this phenomenon as a product of modem society and

modem technologies. Time-compression is itself a highly debatable phenomenon, but let
us consider Castells' and Virilio's claims on the matter anyway and see if we might be
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persuaded.
Castells On Time
Castells (1996) dedicates a chapter of The Rise of the Network Society to what he
refers to as "timeless time," titled: "The Edge of Forever: Timeless Time." In this
chapter Castells begins by footnoting some of the sociologists who have given an
analysis of time, listing Giddens (1984), Lash and Urry (1994), Adam (1990), and even
Durkheim (1912), Sorokin and Merton (1937). Castells also provides a helpful, be it
brief, discussion of "time, history, and society" in the first part of this chapter. Later in
this chapter Castells provides a segment on "instant wars," but his analysis here is a
minor sidetrack in relation to his broader project. Castells, however, being an empiricist,
does provide a nice table on "war deaths relative to world population, by decade, 17292000." Castells informs us that this table supports his argument that the world has been
witnessing a decrease in the scale of death by war in recent years and that "it seems likely
that war will recede to the background of these dominant societies, to flare up from time
to time in a sudden reminder of human nature" (1996, p. 459). What is obvious from
these statements is that despite Castells' surface treatment of war in society, he does not
share in any way Virilio's war model.
Castells' actual analysis of time begins later in this chapter in a section he
subtitles: "Time as the Source of Value: The Global Casino." This is the analysis that we
would expect to emerge from his broader project, and the only one that logically follows
from his network society model.
In this discussion, Castells makes clear the underpinning of his time analysis.
Castells states plainly: "David Harvey adequately represents current transformations in
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capitalism under the formula of time-space compression. Nowhere is this logic more
evident than in the circulation of capital at the global level" (1996, p. 434). The notion of
social time is for Castells absolutely linked to the rest of his analysis, (i.e. the network
society), which, as we have seen, is based upon a post-Marxist analysis of informational
capitalism. Castells further states:
The supersession of time is also at the core of the new organizational
forms of economic activity that I have identified as the network enterprise.
Flexible forms of management, relentless utilization of fixed capital,
intensified performance by labor, strategic alliances, and inter
organizational linkages, all come down to shortening time per operation
and to speeding up turnover of resources (1996, p. 437).
In this chapter Castells provides numerous number charts, tables, and data, as a
responsible sociologist might.

Such as, and when referring to the "global casino"

(comprised of gamblers such as major investment banks, pension funds, mutual funds and
multinational and manufacturing corporations), data from the "average daily transactions
on stock exchanges, 1986-92" (p. 435); "annual hours worked per person, 1870-1979,"
and "potential lifelong working hours, 1950-85" (p. 438); as well as "duration and
reduction of working time, 1970-87" (p. 440). Elsewhere data related to the global
market are presented, a couple being "worldwide foreign direct investment and selected
economic indicators, 1991, and growth rates for 1981-5, 1986-90" (p. 83); and
"transborder financial flows, 1980-92" (p. 94). Castells reports that these data support his
claims on the nature of time-compression and illustrate the nature of the network society
and its influence on social time. Castells maintains that the new informational modes of
development, starting in the 1970s, have significant implications for the social
organization of time.
In Castells' opposition between "the Net" and "the Self," he identifies a split
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between the new logic of the network, and the older, historically rooted, particular
identities of localities. Castells follows Durkheim (1912) in thinking of agrarian societies
as dominated by social and natural rhythms. The industrial revolution is believed to be
the impetus that altered this system of temporal organization. Castells states further:
Now, organizational, technological, and cultural developments
characteristic of the new emerging society, are decisively undermining this
orderly lifecycle without replacing it with an alternative sequence. I
propose the hypothesis that the network society is characterized by
the breaking down of rhymicity, either biological or social, associated
with the notion of lifecycle" (1996, pp. 445-446, bolded text in original).
In his general project Castells includes a discussion of local places versus global
flows. The network is believed to be on the side of global flows, all revolving around the
capitalist market. With this, the network is thought to have powers capable of
I

"annihilating space." Here Virilio and Castells do share a similarity in rhetoric. But as
we will see, their rhetoric is of completely different origins and influences.
What is easy to trace is the line from Marx, to Harvey, to Castells on the matter of
time-compression.

It is Marx who first observed, as Harvey (2001) states: "the

'annihilation of space by time' becomes a historic necessity for capital, and with this
comes the drive to create configurations of space that are 'efficient' (for capital) with
respect to circulation, production, exchange and consumption" (p. 81). Here we witness
most of the foundation for Castells' so-called new network society. In Castells defense,
his work is an attempt to distinguish himself from Harvey and Marx by emphasizing the
"space of flows" as having a logic and space all their own; the new logic thought entirely
dependent upon the new technologies of the modem age (post 1970's). However, what is
clear is that Castells' discussion of time is also Harvey's; Harvey being the originator and
more openly influenced by Marx. Harvey states:
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The experience of time and space has periodically been radically
transformed. We see a particularly strong example of this kind of radical
transformation around 1970: the impact of telecommunications, jet cargo
transport, containerization of road, rail and ocean transport, the
development of future markets, electronic banking and computerized
production systems. We have recently been going through a strong phase
of what I call "time-space compression": the world suddenly feels much
smaller, and the time-horizons over which we can think about social action
become much shorter (2001, p. 123).
The last few sentences from this passage are nearly indistinguishable from those
of Virilio, yet, still very different. The Marxian Harvey clearly directs Castells
understanding of time-compression, which is fundamentally tied to a critical perspective
on capitalist political economy. The materialist conception of history is at the foundation
of all three of these theorists' (Marx, Harvey, Castells) understanding of time.

For

thinkers working within this perspective, technology is the brains of the bourgeois
capitalists, and the military, if it is mentioned at all, is subsumed under this paradigm as
the bourgeois' hands.
If this seems similar to Virilio's conception of history, with the growth of
bourgeois power in the early city, it is and it is not.

Here is the difference: The

bourgeois, for Marx, Harvey and Castells, have gained their power through the logic of
capitalism/materialism. There is no further analysis. Primacy is placed on economics as
the generator of all things, as Marx had said, as men produce, so they are. The network
society is for Castells first a market society. Castells' understanding of social time, or
what he refers to as timeless time is therefore inextricably tied to his materialist
conception of history.
As has been stated, there are similarities to be found in Castells' and Virilio's
description of modem society, technology, and time-compression. But what a closer look
at Virilio's portrait will show is that there are more significant differences. In many
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ways, it would appear that Castells and Virilio are saying the same things about time.
The argument to be made here, however, is that while they hypothesize a number of
similar technological processes, their understanding of these processes are distinct.
Virilio On Time
Virilio's understanding of time, or time-compression, cannot be separated from
his earlier, foundational writings on speed, dromology, and war. Additionally, Virilio's
understandings of time cannot be separated from his ontological footing in
phenomenology. These two essential components of Virilio's work: (1) dromology and
war; and (2) his phenomenological grounding, are what distinguish Virilio's conception
of time from Castells'.
But one might still contest after reading these authors that their language is the
same; they both speak of networks, flows, information and communication technologies,
real time, modernity (as opposed to post), etc. This, however, would be a superficial
interpretation, one oblivious to the backgrounds, methods and overall projects of these
authors.
In examining Virilio's conception of time, we need to first start with his emphasis
on what he has referred to as the "military-scientific complex" (Armitage, 2002, bolded
text in original). Whereas Castells seems to suggest that state and military dominion are
decreasing with the growing power of network flows and transnational capital, Virilio
suggests, while he is well aware of the economic processes globalization, something else.
He points out that many of our modern everyday technologies were first war
technologies. In reminding us of the global political situation at the end of WWII, he
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identifies the importance of deterrence, and gives mention to the origins of some of our
everyday military technologies:
We stopped waging war on each other, we prohibited ourselves from
doing so, yet we threatened each other more and more through the arms
race, the space race and the development of information-satellites,
instantaneous communication, Arpanet, which gave rise to the Internet.
All of this came out of deterrence, which was only made possible with the
creation of a military-industrial complex (1999, p. 34).
Virilio argues that it is therefore impossible to understand the development of
modern science and technology without recognizing the absolute threat of deterrence.
Virilio argues that no longer is there only a militarization of science, but through efforts
such as those of the National Security Agency (NSA), we are additionally witnessing a
militarization of information and knowledge.

On the topic of the Internet, today's

technological example of social change par excellence, Virilio states:
The Internet is the product of the Pentagon, and all the satellite
technologies were initially military. They achieved the militarization of
knowledge, which is an unthinkable phenomenon. The militarization of
science with the military-scientific complex and the militarization of all
information with the military-informational complex confront us with a
phenomenon of totalitarianism that has never existed before (1999, p. 36).
Castells also happens to point out the Internet's military origins, but further
analysis of this fact is entirely absent in his network model. Virilio conceives of modern
technologies as first military technologies.

In the realm of military affairs, the

importance of speed is obvious, this true today as well as historically. We might trace
other important technological advances such as the telegraph, railroad, and
video/surveillance technologies to discover their military genealogies and use.
Yet, the question may remain: "How do these military developments relate to
social time?" In answering this question we should be aware of Virilio's ontological
foundation in phenomenology. Already we have seen that modern technologies have a
27

speed dimension, they reduce distance either physically, or they provide for greater
communication across distances. There is phenomenological connection here. But first
let us review.
The military component of Virilio's thinking has been emphasized here to clearly
show that his understanding of history differs in comparison to many social theorists.
But in addition to his military conception of history, and the way it informs his modem
perspective, Virilio also attempts to convey a deeper understanding of technology itself.
Here phenomenology and the work of Heidegger and Merleu-Ponty hold particular sway
on Virilio's thinking. Below Virilio expresses what he considers to be a major oversight
in much of social theory. The passage below includes what might be understood or
interpreted as a critique of the general perspective that Castells employs in his model of
the network society. This passage also incorporates a phenomenological theme. This is
perhaps the most important passage of this review in terms of showing the contrast
between

Virilio's

and

Castells'

understandings of time-compression,

modem

technologies and society:
To claim, as is now the case, that globalism illustrates the victory
of free enterprise over totalitarian collectivism is to understand nothing of
the current loss of time intervals, the endless feedback, the telescoping of
industrial or post-industrial activities.
How are we to conceive the change wrought by computerization if
we remain tied to an ideological approach, when the urgent need is in fact
for a new geostrategic approach to discover the scale of the phenomenon
that is upon us? And we need to do this to come back to the Earth - not in
the sense of the old earth which sustains and nourishes us, but of the
unique celestial body we occupy. To return to the world, its dimensions
and to the coming loss of those dimensions in the acceleration not now of
history (which, with the loss of local time, has just lost its concrete
foundations), but of reality itself, with the new-found importance of this
world time, a time whose instaneity definitively cancels the reality of
distances" (2000, p. 8, bolded text in original).
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Virilio's arguments on time-compression are phenomenologically based. While
he considers many modern technological tools to have their origins in military science
(serving dromological needs and desires), Virilio also works to suggest that modern
technologies might be having phenomenological effects on human beings and human
being. It is Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger whose work shows through in Virilio's writing
in regards to these points. Of emphasis in phenomenology are notions of being-in-the
world, encountering "the things themselves," and being situated in place and time. On a
certain level, these notions show similarities with Castells discussion of the local versus
global. However, Castells' interpretation of these matters is little more than a surface
treatment. He lacks the philosophical understanding informing Virilio. Castells' efforts
here (staying inline with the rest of his project) might have been better supported had he
appropriated Marx's understanding of human alienation, or something alone these lines.
But Castells simply does not make use of any deeper ontological or theoretical work here;
his arguments largely rest on his numbers.
Virilio's phenomenological understanding of time incorporates some of the
central tenets of phenomenology; the worldliness of beings, their temporality, their being
situated in place/space, subjectivity, etc. The passage below is a clear testament to
Virilio's phenomenological background and his understanding of social/human time:
Human beings exist in the three dimensions of chronological time - past,
present, and future. It is obvious that the liberation of the present -real
time or world time -runs the risk of making us lose the past and future in
favor of a presentification, which amounts to an amputation of the volume
of time. Time is volume; it is not only space-time in the sense of relativity.
It is volume and depth of meaning, and the emergence of one world time
eliminating the multiplicity of local times is a considerable loss for both
geography and history (1999, pp. 81-82).
This passage summarizes much of Virilio's thought on social time. He considers
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new technologies to be a potential threat to situated human being (in a Heideggarian
sense), where everything is present to all places, at all times. Citing Merleau-Ponty,
Virilio expands on these ideas: "Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least
within reach of my sight, marked on the map of the 'I can"' (1994, p. 7, italics in
original). Virilio considers this being, with everything real within reach, as potentially
destroyed by a "certain teletopology."

This is a presenting of everything all at once,

made possible through virtual communication, tele-presence, and surveillance
technologies. Out from this condition, Virilio foresees potential for accident.

With

increasing dependence upon interlocking technologies, often centralized, an error in one
may feed an error in many. While it has not been emphasized here, Virilio also is well
aware of the importance of television, cinema and media in the modem age. Virilio's
own account is most representative of his thought:
The actors and tele-actors of the cybernetic telecommunications
revolution, acting and interacting in real time, set a technical pace or
tempo which now lords it over the properly historical importance of local
time of societies and countries. This works to the exclusive advantage of a
world time which no longer belongs so much to the history of nations as
the abstraction of a universal chronopolitics for which no political
representative is truly responsible, except for certain military general staffs
in the case of cyberwar being declared (2000, pp. 108-109, balded text in
original).
On Time: Conclusion
An attempt has been made here to show how Castells' and Virilio's ideas on time
are distinct. A surface reading of these authors' discussions of time might lead one to
believe Castells and Virilio share similar perspectives on the matter. This would be in
error. The backgrounds, methods, and projects of Castells and Virilio all play a part in
giving form to their understandings of social time and technology. The central argument
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made here is that Castells' conception of modem technology, as an offshoot of capitalist
and market dominance, is shortsighted. Virilio's war model is equally deterministic, but
as the cliche goes, "if the shoe fits . . . "
Summarizing these authors' differences on time, it was shown that Castells'
understanding of time comes directly from Harvey, and likewise, Marx. This
understanding places the economic workings of capitalism at the heart of analysis, be it
time analysis or any other analysis. Virilio's counter is that in addition to an
economically determined understanding of modem technologies and their resultant
(hypothesized) impacts on social time, we also need to consider speed and its relation to
modem technologies and social time. Speed, or dromology, is argued by Virilio to have
played an essential role in historic warfare as well as nation-state building.

These

developments are believed to have had a significant impact on technological
developments and the formation of the modem world.
In short, Castells and Virilio point to a number of the same technologies as having
time-compressing effects, and use much of the same language in so doing. However,
Castells' and Virilio's understandings of the origins and reasons for these technologies
are completely different, as well as are the effects these technologies are suggested to be
having on human society and human being.
Ways of Knowing
What can sociology be? Castells has given us his answer: "Because we need to
know, and because people need to know, more than ever we need a sociology rooted in
its scientific endeavor" (2000a, p. 1). Castells is arrogantly stem about the limits of
sociology: "[A]s would-be scientists of society we are positioned better than anyone else
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to produce knowledge about the new society, and to be credible - or at least more
credible than the futurologists and ideologues that litter the interpretation of current
historical changes, let alone politicians always jumping on the latest trendy word"
(2000a, p. 1). Castells only uses reliable data sources, "broad, accepted consensus among
social scientists (for example, OECD, United Nations, World Bank, governments' official
statistics, authoritative research monographs, generally reliable academic or business
sources)" (1996, p. 26). Castells has gone to great lengths to provide volumes of reliable
and valid data to support his hypotheses. If providing volumes of reliable data and
mathematical statistics constitute sociology as science, then Castells is our scientist.
But we might still ask, what does Castells' science bring us; what have we
learned? Repeatedly the critique of Castells' work is its failure to link theory to data
(Calabrese, 1999; Van Dijk, 1999; Wilenius, 1998; Bromley, 1999).

His empirical

evidence is expected to stand-alone. Calabrese states: "Despite the author's occasional
protests throughout against devolving too much into theorizing, the work would have
been strengthened significantly by a more solid and unifying base of social explanation"
(p. 3). Bromley states in similar fashion:
The reader of The Rise of the Network Society will find much descriptive,
economic sociology on the rise of the network organization and
networking as a mode of economic co-ordination . . . But these
contributions, valuable and informative though they undoubtedly are, do
not add up to a theory of the new economic order" (p. 14).
Castells would later (2000a) write an article disclosing m greater depth his
theoretical backgrounds. But as was shown with Harvey's influence, Castells' applies
very little theory to explain his model of the network society.

Castells' theoretical

avoidance is a failure to address the first step of science: defining the problem - or the
nature and parameters of what one is studying. How are we to interpret foundationless
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data; data that comes with little explanation? Certainly we cannot make an example of
Castells' failures to link data to theory as representative of scientific sociology in general,
or can we? Is this not often raised as a critique of numeric sociology? In reading the
journals of scientific sociology one might witness what Spengler refers to as a conquest
by measurement. This is, of course, not itself an error at all. Ideally strong data is

combined with strong theory to produce knowledge. But the question that remains is
what form of empiricism is acceptable to sociology?

Sociology has long sought to

distinguish itself from philosophy, the latter being a metaphysical-mythological abyss,
not science. But we might be reminded of the fact that science was itself the product of
philosophy, and not the reverse. Of course we owe a multitude of thanks to science and
rationality, which have vastly improved the quality of life and advanced reasoned
thought. This is not the critique raised here. Yet, in regards to social things, ways of
knowing, and human being, there are still questions left to be asked, as Spengler
continues:
Even if an investigator puts on one side every hypothesis that he knows as
such, as soon as he sets his thought to work on the supposedly clear task,
he is not controlling but being controlled by the unconscious form of it, for
in living activity he is always a man of his Culture, of his age, of his
school and of his tradition. Faith and "knowledge" are only two species of
inner certitude, but of the two faiths is the older and it dominates all the
conditions of knowing, be they never so exact. And thus it is theories and
not pure numbers that are the support of all natural sciences ...Mere
industrious measuring for measuring' s sake is not and never has been
more than a delight for little minds. Numbers may only be the key of the
secret, no more. No significant man would ever have spent himself on
them for their own sake (1926, p. 379).
Spengler's account shares similarities with that of the phenomenological critique
of positive science. Husserl wanted to create a science, but a unique science distinct from
objective natural science. Husserl's was a science of phenomena; "a science covering a
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new field of experience, exclusively its own, that of "transcendental subjectivity" (1958,
p. 11). Heidegger would take up Husserl's science and attempt to expand it, stressing the
previously unraveled nature of being.

Heidegger holds that investigations failing to

address the nature of being are near arbitrary:
We must show that all previous questions and investigations which aim at
Dasein fail to see the real philosophical problem, regardless of their
factual productivity. Thus, as long as they persist in this attitude, they
may not claim to be able to accomplish what they are fundamentally
striving for at all. In distinguishing existential analytic from anthropology,
psychology, and biology, we shall confine ourselves to what is in principle
the fundamental ontological question (1996, p. 43).
Virilio utilizes a phenomenological perspective m his investigations.

The

accounts raised by Spengler, Husserl and Heidegger are not considered to be merely
philosophical tangents to a sociological discussion. They are quite relevant to the theme
of this thesis.

Virilio presents a seemingly unorthodox method of surveying social

reality, and he goes as far as to incorporate myth. Does this make his social observations
any less empirical? As we have witnessed, his method of gathering social knowledge is
not wholly philosophical, his interests are politics and war, real world phenomena. The
argument put forth here is that if sociology is an attempt to understand real world human
phenomenon, then despite Virilio's critique of the "surface effect" of sociology, his work
is still largely sociological. Perhaps then it is not the phenomenological efforts of Virilio
that are in need of change before they fit within the accepted and respectable mold of
scientific sociology.

Instead what might use change is numeric sociology itself, its

dependence on data and numbers, its avoidance of philosophy, theory and history, its
stance that only it possesses the methods and tools capable of comprehending and gaining
social knowledge.
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CHAPTER ill
THE SOCIOLOGY OF TIME
While much of this thesis might be thought of a literature review of sorts, it is the
intent of this section to survey some of literature found specifically within sociology on
time. One of the first to study time as a social phenomenon in its own right was Emile
Durkheim. Durkheim was certainly no stranger to foundational sociological research, but
apart from only a handful of other noteworthy inquires, sociology as discipline has not
spent a whole lot of time on time. Times are, however, changing. And it is not that time
has received no attention within sociology; it is that time has received only minimal
attention in relation to its proposed importance.
Receiving even less attention within past and recent literature is the proposed
relationship between technology and time. Here a brief overview of some of the
contributions to the sociology of time is presented. Additionally, a few recent studies
within sociology on technology and time are reviewed.
The Sociology of Time: A Few Examples
John Hassard's book The Sociology of Time compiles writings from some 20th
century sociologists who have approached time as a topic of research. This text provides
a comprehensive compilation of the chief works within sociology specifically on time.
The purpose of this section is to briefly review some of these contributions.
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Hassard makes a case that time is the missing variable in modern sociological
analysis. Durkheim's study The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) is cited as
one of the earliest works to provide a lead into the study of social temporality. Hassard
argues that in spite of Durkheim's early lead, time as a social phenomenon has not
received a great deal of attention. While sociologists often treat time as a contingent
feature within their research, they rarely treat it as a topic of interest in its own right.
Hassard argues that sociological research has for the most part placed a greater emphasis
on synchronic rather than longitudinal studies, with enduring structures receiving more
attention than dynamism of flux.

Hassard explains that "slice-through time"

investigations, investigations based on one-shot statistical correlation, have taken
precedence within sociological research (Hassard, 1990).
Durkheim is recognized as one of the earliest contributors to the sociological
analysis of time. Following in Durkheim's path a French tradition would take form, with
Hubert and Mauss being noteworthy figures. In researching time, Durkheim's primary
emphasis was on the rhythmic and temporal nature of social life. Durkheim thought of
social time as "qualitative-time." Qualitative-time as a concept shares a degree of
similarity with the subjective perception of time found within Kant's philosophy (to be
explored in further detail later on). Under such a schema, the mathematical or measured
duration of time is not so much of interest. Instead, time is viewed more as a structure
within human cognition and experience.
Durkheim believed that all members of a society share a common temporal
consciousness. As a collective phenomenon, time is a social category of thought. From
this shared understanding, a society gains its cultural rhythm. Durkheim had said: "the
rhythm of collective life dominates and encompasses the varied rhythms of all the
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elementary lives from which it results; consequently, the time that is expressed dominates
and encompasses all particular durations" (Hassard, 1990, p. 3). From this statement we
infer that Durkheim placed an emphasis on the rhythm of the collective or shared life.
Collective life is suspected of dominating varied and particular durations.
Durkheim sought primarily to differentiate social time from objective or
Newtonian mathematical time.

For Durkheim, time was not a system of uniform

duration, but instead a socially created system of collective concepts and symbols.
Aiding in an understanding of this conception of time is Durkheim's model of society as
an independent set of social facts whose phenomena are not reducible to individual
consciousness or single minds (Bergmann, 1992). In a transcendental sense, time, as
another social fact, lies outside the individual consciousness and belongs to a society.
From Durkheim's perspective we see time and time ordering as social in nature, where
"social time reckoning is an expression of a collective's rhythm of activity (festivals,
rites, etc.)" (Bergmann, 1992, p. 83). Social rhythms are an important part of all of this.
In social rhythms are not a uniform duration, they are comprised of events imbued with
pulse and meaning by the society in which they take place. As Miller continues: "Time
is durational rather than featureless. It has rhythms. There are rhythms of sacred-profane
life, and of collective-individual life. These universal characteristics have particular local
shapes in particular local ways of life and representations" (Miller, 2000, p. 16). In sum,
time reckoning is thought of as a collective endeavor of a society, it takes on social
meaning through the rhythms and practices of a society, coming together as social fact.
Also attempting to show time as a specific social fact were Sorokin and Merton.
Similar to Durkheim, Sorokin and Merton worked to identify the temporal basis of belief
and custom. Elsewhere Sorokin critiqued clock-driven society where "actions are not
37

always afforded the time spans that seem appropriate to circumstance. Instead actions
become bound by the mechanically imposed units of clock-time" (Hassard, 1990, p. 4).
Narrowing in, Sorokin looks closer at the obsession of modem society with mechanical
scheduling of activities and events, where universal clock-time is imposed on the
majority of formal human actions (Hassard, 1990). One sees connections here to what
Oswald Spengler (1926) referred to as the clock-obsessed modem man. Sorokin and
Merton attempted to identify time as a legitimate subject for sociology by showing its
sociocultural character.
Through Sorokin and Merton's work we see once agam that social time is
considered not as a set of natural units but as social constructs. These social constructs
have played an essential role in the formation of our calendar. Sorokin's individual work
on the matter (1943) went even further to suggest that the social science is not served by
a physical, mathematical, biological or psychological time, but rather needs an "adequate
conception of sociocultural time as one of their main referential principles" (Bergmann,
1992, p. 85).
Continuing with a review of some of the studies within sociology on time,
Hassard outlines the work of Goerges Gurvitch (1964).

Gurvitch would make a

contribution to a sociological inquiry of time primarily by advancing the argument that
within a society there exists a plurality of social-times. Modem class-bound society is
believed to encompass a number of conflicting times. According to Gurvitch, systems
and institutions are analyzed on a "macro-social-time" level, while "micro-social-times"
are aligned more with the actions of groups and communities. Like Sorokin and Merton,
Gurvitch makes a distinction between clock time and social time, where social time is
"not always measurable and even more not always quantifiable" (Hassard, 1990, p. 5).
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Developing a less abstract, more functionalist perspective of time was Wilbert
Moore (1963).

Moore emphasized the objective qualities of time in suggesting that

social-time is comprised of three elements: synchronization, sequence and rate. Moore
sought to illustrate time's objective representation in society, with the idea of clock-time
taking focus. Moore emphasized as well the idea of time as scare resource and as a
source of purposive manipulation where social factors such as power and loyalty are on
display (Hassard, 1990).
In addition to presenting some the main ideas from the work of the authors cited
above, Hassard also provides a discussion of some of the images of time found within
social theory (leaning toward realms of social-philosophy as well). Some of these images
of time have already been touched upon. Referred to here are the ways in which time
might be thought of or conceptualized.

Examples include: time as qualitative or

quantitative; time as social or clock; time as subjective and objective; as scare resource;
as a medium of meaning; etc.
In the sociological sphere of time analysis, as we have seen, many start with this
distinction between clock time and social time. Durkheim, Sorokin, Gurvitch, Moore,
and Bourdieu have all taken up such an approach. Hassard tells also of some of the "time
metaphors" frequently employed as conceptual frames of reference in understanding time
as a social phenomenon.

Two primary time metaphors identified:

linear time and

circular time. Linear time is frequently associated with an objective and chronological
understanding, whereas circular time is denoted as experiential and epochal (Hassard,
1990). Hassard adds that for those working through a concept of time as circular, often
referenced are primitive time orientations of pre-Christian origin. Hassard cites the work
of Eliade (1959) as working to clarify circular time. Eliade looks to the practices of
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certain early civilizations, stating that: "For archaic man events unfolded in an ever
recurring rhythm; his sense of time was developed out of his struggle with the seasons;
his time horizon was defined by the 'myth of the eternal retum"'(Hassard, 1990, p.9).
Nietzsche would undoubtedly agree. Eliade considers the historic influence of
Christianity, where Christian man is said to have left the bounded world for a "direct,
linear progression to redemption and salvation, then for the first time he found himself
exposed to the dangers inherent in the historical process" (Hassard, 1990, p. 9). Finishing
the point, Hassard speculates that man has since often sought to master history and bring
it to a conclusion. Here thinkers such as Hegel and Marx are brought up. Hassard might
be on to something, a number of thinkers before and after Hegel and Marx have tried to
predict the end of history.
An insightful point made by Hassard is that in modem society, with temporal
spacing based on mathematical intervals and clock systems, rhythms in society become
increasingly divorced from nature as time units become more artificial. Accordingly,
social rhythms (in a Durkheimian sense) are also suspected of acquiring an "artificial"
quality (Hassard, 1990, p. 10).
Turning now to the topic of linear time, it is St. Augustine who is said to have
broken the circle. In dispelling the "false circle," St. Augustine upheld the straight line of
human history (Hassard, 1990). This Christian idea is an important one, and provides the
basis for the distinction between pre-Christian and post-Christian understandings of
historical time. Additionally, and further down the historical line, Hassard explains that
with the growth of industrial capitalism the linear image of time would be joined with the
idea of time as valuable commodity. One of the most recognizable time metaphors
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) recite is that of time as money. Mumford (1934) correctly
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identifies the clock at the core of this commodification process: "the clock not the steam
engine was the key machine of the industrial age" (Hassard, 1990, p. 12). Rigid time
schedules are an essential feature of modem capitalism. Marx had done a great deal to
develop this line of argument when analyzing the selling of one's time by the hour, where
one sells their time as much as their labor: "Time becomes a commodity to be earned,
spent or saved" (Hassard, 1990, p. 13). In laying out a research framework for studying
and researching time in society, Hassard lists these areas of investigation: time as social
factor, time as causal link, time as quantitative measure, time as qualitative measure.
With social interaction in mind, time shows itself as a social factor in two
principal ways: (1) as a resource, and (2) as a social meaning. The first of these, time as
resource, is again tied to time's commodity image. Time exists in this area as finite
intervals of worth, largely tied to industrial capitalism. But Hassard reminds that when
time is thought of in these terms, it should not simply be objectified as a resource,
because time also possesses social meaning, just as Sorokin and Merton argued
(Hassard, 1990).

Hassard explains that time is a medium through which complex

meaning structures are generated. Through these we coordinate and reproduce everyday
events. In the sphere of time as social factor, time might be studied as a concrete and
factual resource, or as a medium of cultural meaning.
In examining time as a causal link, time can be shown to tie variables of a
hypothesized model together.

In causal relations, time can either give evidence or

remove evidence from a proposed relationship. In social theory, time is also envisioned
as a context in which events occur. Hassard provides examples of historical epochs such
as the Renaissance or Victorian era, where particular events may be interpreted/compared
as either fitting or going against the supposed characteristics of an era.
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Time might also be studied as a quantitative measure; this through interval scales
and a measurement of quantitative changes in relationships. In providing an example,
Hassard explains how the length of a particular event might yield different consequences:
"Thus, whereas a brief loss of structure, such as in panic, may disrupt system equilibrium,
a longer breach of a similar type could destroy the larger structure as a functioning
system" (1990, p. 15).
In studying time as a qualitative measure, Hassard mentions the difference
between social change and social process. Social change is representative of a qualitative
difference in an end state, while social process entails phases of equilibrium in a stable
context. Time is important here in terms of the relationships between duration, sequence,
rate and intensity (Hassard, 1990, p. 17).
Durkheim's contributions and lead into social time analysis have been taken up to
some degree by other researchers both in sociology and anthropology, but as Bergmann
(1992) argues, there has been a lack of empirical studies that are adequately grounded in
theory. Bergmann thoroughly summarizes the situation:
Here we have already arrived at the "blank areas," because "time
sociology" lacks above all empirical studies in which the time aspect is the
main theme. Empirical material is essentially only available where related
disciplines such as psychology or ethnology have developed it. As
Schlesinger (1977, p. 337) observed correctly, social time has only been
investigated in "primitive" societies, but not in modern societies, for the
analysis of which sociologists lack the empirical material. In addition to
investigations of entire societies, which would certainly be very difficult
given the complexity of modern societies, there is also a lack of
investigations of the temporal structures of social subsystems and
subcultures that could support analyses of entire societies from the
viewpoint of the sociology of time. In addition to theoretical explanations
of the concept of time and empirical studies, the study of the time
structures of social subsystems is among the most urgent tasks of a
sociology of time (Bergmann, 1992, p. 126).
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Social Analysis of Time: Technology and Time
Social theorist Barbara Adam has made a strong effort to draw greater attention to
the social analysis of time through numerous books and publications on the topic, often
with technology infused within the discussions.

She provides below a persuasive

justification for the social analysis of time. This passage also serves well as introduction
to the broader study:
At an early age children of industrial societies learn to tell the time but
even as adults they still find it hard to think what time might be. Firmly
embedded in western culture we are able to give an operational definition
of time which relates to its measurement and allows us to orientate in a
time grid of clearly defined units without needing to know much about
time: time is presupposed as an objective, separate, quantifiable
phenomenon. All too often, these common-sense assumptions inform
social science theory and research practice. This means that time is a
taken-for-granted concept that remains largely unexplored and
unquestioned even when it is the focus of social science attention (Adam,
1992, pp. 175-176).
With the connection between time and technology having gone largely
unexplored in prior sociological research, the importance of such research is apparent.
Researchers who take this relationship seriously think it particularly important in our
modem age, when technological developments of various kinds seem to be taking place
at brake-pace rates.

Certainly then, research of this nature is relevant to sociology.

Making this research difficult, however, is that time and technology are broad and
abstract concepts, ones that are not easily operationalized, at least not to the full extent of
their meaning(s). Therefore, concise and directed empirical research related to time and
technology presents a daunting task. Within the theoretical realm, the nuances of these
concepts are more easily addressed. Without question, a study of this nature requires a
developed theoretical foundation.
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In drawing attention to the technology and time connection, Adam makes a
persuasive argument that social scientists to date have largely been concerned only with
the symbolic nature of time, if they have been concerned with at all:
The largely unquestioned nature of social time, however, necessitates
special treatment. Exploration of the intersections and the mutual
interpenetration of "modem times" and technology requires therefore that
we make visible what normally constitutes unacknowledged assumptions,
that bring some everyday aspects of contemporary time to the forefront of
our attention (Adam, 1992, pp. 176-177).
Adam identifies modernity and technology as mutually defining: "Science and
technology are implicated in almost every aspect of contemporary western life. They
constitute its rationality" (1992, p. 176). Adam cites technological items such as
machines, nuclear power, telecommunications, satellites, television, clocks and global
time-zones as ubiquitous features of everyday modem life that have influence "beyond
their artefactual boundaries and their use value" (Adam, 1992, p. 176). What might these
influences be? And what might be the time implications? Adam further explores these
questions by identifying the taken for granted nature in which we, even social scientists,
most often speak of time. Words such as "interval," "sequence," "rate," and "duration"
are said to evoke the image of a long straight line in which events can be located and
distances measured (Adam, 1992).

Similar then to Durkheim, Adam seeks an

understanding of time that goes beyond our everyday sense of it in its linear and
sequential forms. Adam points to modem science and Newtonian physics as largely
responsible for the pervasiveness of the quantitative understanding of time. A question
that stems from Adams' discussion is whether or not recent technological developments
may be altering our understanding of time. Adam reminds us that travel time had been
constant for a very long period in history, but that "with motorized travel, electricity,
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telecommunication and the wireless telegraph this established relationship between time
and space became separated and relativized" (1992, p. 184). Similar versions of these
themes will show up throughout this effort.
In focusing closer on the hypothesized relationship between technology and time,
we tum now to a recent study of time and the Internet that incorporates many of the
issues raised prior (Lee and Liebenau, 2000). Like many of the other authors discussed
prior, authors Lee and Liebenau also draw attention to the socially constructed nature of
time, where again Durkheim's influence is clear:
It is as social and cultural as anything else: rituals, customs, diets, and so
on. Heavenly bodies move regularly in fixed periods of time; the earth
revolves around the sun and rotates on its own axis completing regular
cycles. However, it is human affairs that interpret and measure those
movements into the calendar year and the 24-hour day (Lee & Liebenau,
2000, p. 44).
Here it is time's social nature that is of interest. Lee and Liebenau make a
historical stop much prior to modernity and modem science in their analysis. Modernity
and modem science are suspected of having an influence on time's linear and sequential
forms, but Lee and Liebenau make note of the importance of religion and metaphysics in
influencing ideas on time:
Christianity established the concept of linear (irreversible) time, which has
since dominated ideas of time in Western culture. The Christian belief in
the birth, Crucifixion and death of Christ as unique, unrepeatable events
made people regard time as a linear path that stretches between past and
future (2000, pp. 44-45).
Establishing the importance of the Christian calendar in the West, Lee and
Liebenau move forward historically to illustrate the impact of the mechanical clock in the
17th and 18th centuries. The authors follow Mumford who asserts (as stated elsewhere):
"the clock, not the steam-engine, is the key-machine of the modem industrial age" (2000,
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p. 47).
If the clock is the key-machine of the modern industrial age, perhaps the computer
is the key-machine of the hypennodern age? Lee and Liebenau would seem to think so.
Citing Failla and Bagnara (1992), the authors state that:
information technology causes profound changes in the time-frame
patterns of the decision-making process. It also eliminates rigidity in work
rhythms, giving flexibility. The organization of work is becoming less
and less rigid in terms of time-patterns. This is especially true of
professional work performed in offices with information technology
support (2000, p. 49).
In relation to the larger project, this statement is important in its attempt to draw a
relationship between technology and time, information and decisions. The argument put
forth by these authors is that certain developments in information technology provide for
a state of virtual reality, suspected of having a qualitative impact on time:
The new technologies make it possible to project a virtual reality
environment, and help us to simulate the consequences in advance. The
decision- making process has always been based on past experiences.
With this technology, however, we can gain experience of scenarios or
events that have never been encountered in real life. Virtual reality
technology therefore allows "future" or unexperienced [sic] experiences to
be experienced (Lee & Liebenau, 2000, p. 50).
Summarizing Lee and Liebenau, their study started with the premise that time is a
socially constructed feature of a society, a feature capable of undergoing change
culturally and historically. With this, the nature of time organization is thought to be
influenced by the characteristics of the social world. The authors identify information
technology as a characteristic of the modern social world, and extrapolate from this that
advances in technology may well be having an influence on the experience of time (Lee
& Liebenau, 2000).
This has been only a brief review of the available literature on time, and time and
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technology within sociology. Themes that stand out, however, are the lack of empirical
studies within this area, the difficulty of conducting such empirical studies, and the need
for further theoretical development. Durkheim's contributions to the study of social time
should be of certain interest to sociologists looking to embark on the topic. The available
literature shows the ways in which time has been examined thus far within sociology.
What this literature also attests to are the different ways in which time has been thought
of and organized across societies and history. Researchers interested in both time and
technology might also benefit from an awareness of the history of technology, with
modernity an era of definite importance.
Two contemporary social theorists who share interests in modernity, technology
and time are Paul Virilio and Manuel Castells. While these authors employ different
methods and conceptual frameworks, they make similar and differing claims in regards to
modernity, new technologies, and time compression. Both compare and contrast local
and social conceptions of time to global and technological "real-time" conceptions. Both
place concern with the idea that historical time, which is understood as the time of
process, might be influenced (in stronger language - annihilated) by the instantaneous
real-time technologies and information systems of the modem era.
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CHAPTER IV
THE INTELLECTUAL-ONTOLOGICAL BACKGROUNDS
OF CASTELLS AND VIRILIO
Consider, first, the turnover time of capital. There is an omnipresent
incentive for individual capitalists to accelerate their turnover time vis-a
vis the social average, and in so doing promote a social trend towards
faster average turnover times. Capitalism, as we shall see, has for this
reason been characterized by continuous efforts to shorten turnover times,
thereby speeding up social processes while reducing the time horizons of
meaningful decision-making (Harvey, 1989, p. 229)
Time presupposes a view of time. It is, therefore, not like a river, a
flowing substance. The fact that the metaphor based on this comparison
has persisted from the time of Heraclitus to our own day is explained by
our surreptitiously putting into the river a witness of its course ...Now,
no sooner have I introduced an observer, whether he follows the river or
whether he stands on the bank and observes its flow, than temporal
relationships are reversed (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 411).
The purpose of this section is to take a closer look at the ontological backgrounds
of Manuel Castells and Paul Virilio. What ideas shape these authors' understanding of
the social world? More specifically, what are the background ideas that shape and direct
Castells' and Virilio's understanding of social time? Technology is the crux of Castells'
and Virilio's work reviewed here. As we have seen, both Castells and Virilio propose
arguments related to technology, modernity, and "time-compression." Atjunctures, these
arguments seem very similar, and in many ways they are. Yet, the point to be made here
is that while Castells and Virilio may seem to be saying many of the same things about
modern social time and "time-compression," their understandings of the fundamental
nature and origins of this (hypothesized) phenomena are quintessentially different. A
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reflection on the genealogy of Castells' and Virilio's thought will show that these authors
possess and utilize in their time investigations separate ontological frameworks. The
following is a review of the ways in which these ontological frameworks differ.
Castells' Ontological Background
Let us first review Castells' broader project in relation to the time-compression
argument, as presented in The Rise of the Network Society. The "network society" is
Castells' model of the modem world. The network model consists primarily of the
components: informationalism and capitalist restructuring. Castells conceives of time
compression as the sum of informationalism plus capitalist restructuring. Exactly how
time-compression is yielded from informationalism and capitalist restructuring requires
further explanation. Summarizing Castells' network model of society is Castells who
comprehensively states:
The network society, in its various institutional expressions, is, for the
time being, a capitalist society. Furthermore, for the first time in history,
the capitalist mode of production shapes social relationships over the
entire planet. But this brand of capitalism is profoundly different from its
historical predecessors. It has two fundamental distinctive features: it is
global, and it is structured to a large extent, around a network of financial
flows. Capital works globally as a unit in real time; and it is realized,
invested and accumulated mainly in the sphere of circulation, that is as
finance capital. While finance capital has generally been among the
dominant fractions of capital, we are witnessing the emergence of
something different: capital accumulation proceeds, and its value-making
is generated, increasingly, in the global financial markets enacted by
information networks in the timeless space of financial flows (1996, pp.
471-472).
We have in this passage Castells' network model and its time dimensions clearly
laid out. What is the basis and foundation of modem timelessness according to Castells?
Directly we read that it is "global financial markets enacted by information networks in
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the timeless space of financial flows" (1996, p. 472). The majority of Castells' major
work (The Rise of the Network Society) is dedicated to explaining and defending the
network model as presented in the passage above.

We know already of Castells'

background in post-Marxism. The Marxian notion taking primacy here and in later
discussions is that of historical materialism. Stated simply, the argument to be made here
is that Castells remains largely Marxian in his analysis. Castells makes a number of
breaks from traditional Marxian thought, but what is clear is that his network model
remains resolutely Marxian in that it upholds a material conception of history and a
conflict perspective of market society.
It has been shown prior that Castells draws largely from the work of David
Harvey, particularly in his analysis of social time. More than any other theorist Castells
references to Harvey's ideas are most evident. Complicating matters, however, is the
disjunction between the network model of society that Castells presents, and his
suggestion that capitalist logic is not entirely responsible for social and cultural
transformations (this in opposition to Harvey). Castells states that Harvey "gives to
capitalist logic more responsibility than it deserves for current processes of cultural
transformation," (1996, p. 462) yet, Castells presents no other explanation than his
network model in accounting what might be responsible in processes of cultural
transformation.

Perhaps these answers are to be found elsewhere in Castells work

(volumes II and ID of The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture). But what is
clear is that these answers are not found in the primary work, volume I, The Rise of the
Network Society. It is difficult to imagine how Castells might implant alternative
explanations on top of or in place of the primary logic of the network model since this is
the basis of his analysis.
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The time component of Castells' work must also correlate with the basic features
of his network model if we are to afford this model any analytic consistency or relevance.
Castells' appropriation of Harvey's work is consistent with his broader framework; in
fact Harvey appears in many ways to be the direct informant of Castells' ideas on time.
Yet, with his discussion of time, Castells will in places implant ideas that are inconsistent
with the reasoning of his broader model. In a section titled, "Time, Space, and Society:
the Edge of Forever" Castells states regarding time: "For the sake of my exploration, I
find it helpful to call upon Leibniz, for whom time is the order of succession of "things,"
so that without "things" there would be no time" (1996, p. 464). While these words
would seem to suggest that Castells' ontology extends beyond Marx and Harvey, the
application of any such ontology is non-existent. There is little connection between this
statement and Castells' network model of society. Castells calls upon Leibniz for hardly
a paragraph and a footnote in close to 500 pages of text in The Rise of the Network
Society. The argument here is that Castells' ontology is grounded primarily in Marx and

Harvey, this particularly so in relation to his understanding of time and time
compress1on.

Following Harvey's lead, Castells utilizes a "materialist conception of

time" in his analysis. An explanation of what exactly is meant by this notion requires a
review of Marx and some of the basic doctrines of materialist thought. Following a brief
review of Marx and materialism, a closer examination of the work of Harvey and his
influence on Castells will follow.
Marx and the Materialist Conception of History
To reflect on Marx is in part to reflect on Hegel, so we might do that briefly here.
Hegel states of philosophy and history:
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The only Thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of
History, is the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign
of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a
rational process ...That this 'Idea' or 'Reason' is the True, the Eternal,
the absolutely powerful essence; that it reveals itself in the World, and that
in the World nothing else is revealed but this and its honor and glory - is
the thesis which as we have said, has been proved in Philosophy, and is
here regarded as demonstrated (Magill, 1990, p.368).
Hegel speaks here of philosophy as the contemplation of history, and as history as
a rational process based in reason. In this passage Hegel places a non-temporal or eternal
reason as the sovereign of a temporal world history. History moves as a process, whereas
reason transcends history as the true and eternal. Additionally, "Spirit" is an important
concept for Hegel. Hegel understood history as the movement of Spirit toward the
attainment of self-consciousness.
To comprehend world history as the progress of the consciousness of
Spirit it is necessary to arrive at a conceptual grasp of the three
constitutive elements which structure historical movement: (1) The Idea
of Spirit, (2) the means of actualization, and (3) the State as the final and
perfect embodiment of Spirit (Magill, 1990, p. 367).
Hegel's dialectical triad of being, nothing, and becoming with emphasis on
determinate negation (or thesis, antithesis, synthesis), is at the core of his philosophy.
Marx employs the dialectic form of Hegel's philosophy in his view of history and
change. Marx, however, leaves out the emphasis on development of mind, spirit, and
self-consciousness. Whereas Hegel viewed history as the development of self-awareness,
Marx has in its place historical material relations.With Hegel's dialectic form in place,
Marx's begins with "real individuals as they produce," stating:
The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living
human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical
organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest
of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical
nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself
geological, or hydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history
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must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the
course of history through the action of man (Marx, 1947, p. 163).
The form of Marx's ontology follows closely with Hegel's dialectical model, but
again, where Hegel looked to spirit and mind, Marx looks to actual material conditions,
social dynamics, and the historical material stages of contradiction and resolution. In
connection with the influence of Feuerbach, Marx would turn away from the idealism of
his intellectual predecessors and direct his attention to "real sensuous activity." Man
produces only as he cooperates with other men, Marx asserts, and the whole of society is
determined by the means, forces, and relations of production. Material property might
then be thought of as a relationship amongst people more so than a thing in itself. Two
additional elements of the Marxian model are social structure and superstructure; social
structure being the organization of classes based on property and one's relation to the
means of production; super structure consisting of the cultural, ideational, or ideological
elements of a society which hold together that society's values and norms.
Conflict is a requisite component of Marx's model. Implicit in his dialectic
materialism, conflict is the driving force pushing society toward the future stage of
communism. No one is without interests, and these interests determine the nature of
conflict. Here of course Marx makes the assumption that one's interests depend upon
which group he/she is from. Marx presents a two group, two class society, consisting of
the oppressing bourgeoisie and the oppressed proletariat. Because conflict is based upon
one's relation to the means of production, conflict is material/economic in origin, and the
owners of the means of production are also the owners of men:
The labor-process, turned into the process by which the capitalist
consumes labor-power, exhibits two characteristic phenomena. First, the
laborer works under the control of the capitalist to whom his labor
belongs; the capitalist taking good care that the work is done in a proper
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manner, and that the means of production are used with intelligence, so
that there is no unnecessary waste of raw material, and no wear and tear of
the implements beyond what is necessarily caused by the work (Marx,
1996, p. 149).
Marx and Engels' famous statement from their 1948 manifesto reads: "The
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." Marx proclaimed
that the only way to overturn this historical conflict is for workers of the world to realize
their universal position of slavery and revolt. For Marx, conflict is antagonistic, and is
the driving force of historical change. For Marx, material relations are the basis of social
conflict and human history.
Harvey and the Materialist Conception of Time

David Harvey's work is solidly grounded in Marxian theory. Harvey has done a
great deal to advance the study of geography and space employing a Marxian perspective
of capitalist society. Harvey is also recognized as a prominent voice in the discussion of
"postmodemity." Two of his primary works on these topics serve as reference points
here, The Condition of Postmodemity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change
and Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography. Part ill of The Condition of
Postmodemity is titled: "The Experience of Space and Time," and it is in this section that
we find some of Harvey's ideas on space, time, and time-compression. With our interest
in time and Harvey's influence on Castells, the ideas from this section are those we will
focus on.
In The Condition of Postmodemity, Harvey gives a detailed survey of some of the
major developments in the philosophical and social analysis of time. In his discussion of
the experience of space and time, we see references to authors such as Bergson, Proust,
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Joyce, Hareven, Dilthey, Durkheim, Foucault, Bourdieu, Hagerstrand, Kant, and
Heidegger. Certainly, Harvey is well informed. Harvey's incorporation of a vast array of
philosophical perspectives is impressive and well executed. Harvey covers a great deal
of ground in his discussions on space and time in The Condition of Postmodernity. But
what interests us here, in terms of Harvey's understanding of time and his influence on
the sociologist Castells, is not so much where Harvey has been in his survey, but where
he ends up. Harvey argues adamantly that neither space nor time can be understood apart
from or independent of material processes:
The conclusion we should draw is simply that neither time nor space can
be assigned objective meanings independently of material processes, and
that it is only through investigation of the latter that we can properly
ground our concepts of the former ... From this materialist perspective we
can then argue that objective conceptions of time and space are necessarily
created through material practices and processes which serve to reproduce
social life (1989, p. 204).
With this very "physical" understanding of the relationship between matter, time and
space established, Harvey takes the next step in asserting that:
Since capitalism has been (and continues to be) a revolutionary mode of
production in which the material practices and processes of social
reproduction are always changing, it follows that the objective qualities as
well as the meanings of space and time also change (1989, p. 204).
There is a step Marxian/materialist thinkers often make in their analyses regarding
the materialist conception of history. It is often the case, as it is here with Harvey, that
after pointing out that human life stems from material being, subsistence, production,
etc., that the other Marxian assumptions necessarily follow. That, if it is true man's
existence is foremost material, it is also true that man's existence is based on a
dialectically material class conflict. Castells' critical analysis of market society does not
stray far from these assumptions. Important with this discussion and the review of
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Virilio, is whether or not this emphasis on material (economic) conflict within a society is
complete.
In The Condition of Postmodemity, beginning on page 211 of the text, Harvey
presents a commentary on the work of Hagerstrand. Hagerstrand is cited as having
pioneered time geography through an empirical analysis of daily practices of individuals.
Hagerstrand tracked the daily routines of individuals' "life paths in time-space," and
extended this tracking to migratory movements over phases of a life-span (1989). Harvey
states that Hagerstrand's work is a useful descriptor of the way in which individuals'
lives unfold in space and time, but that it lacks explanation of how and why certain social
projects/processes dominate in relation to others. Harvey reasons that "assembling
massive empirical data on time-space biographies does not get at the answers to these
broader questions, even though the record of such biographies forms a useful datum for
considering the time - space dimension of social practices" (1989, pp. 212-213). 1 From
here,

Harvey

moves

on

to contrast some of the

socio-psychological and

phenomenological approaches of time and space analysis with that of Hagerstrand's time
data, empirical/biography approach. Harvey's primary critique of Hagerstrand's data
driven analysis is that it misses the structuring behind an individual's use of time.
Harvey turns briefly to some of the ideas presented by (relatively contemporary) authors
working from a more or less phenomenological approach, such as de Certeau, Bachelard,
Bourdieu, Foucault, and Gurvitch. Once again, Harvey's grasp and explanation of a vast
array of theoretical and philosophical perspectives is impressive and well executed; his

1

This is an interesting point/contrast in relation to Harvey's influence on Castells. The entirety of Castells'
analysis might be conceived of as an empirical investigation attempting to support Harvey's argument
regarding material/capitalist structure (or re-structuring under Castells' network logic) as the primary
director of social time.
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presentation of these authors' work is instructive. However, important to our discussion
is where we find Harvey after all is said and done, or where his own arguments reside
concerning the nature of social time. As we will see, these arguments reside in the same
place as do Castells', with Harvey being the forbearer.

Making his position clear,

Harvey states: "The general argument I shall explore is that in money economies in
general, and in capitalist society in particular, the intersecting of command of money,
time, and space forms a nexus of social power that we cannot afford to ignore" (1989, p.
225).

This "nexus of social power" is that which Harvey believes lacking in

Hagerstrand's purely empirical work. Harvey believes that an examination of the "nexus
of social power" will lead to a better explanation of the structuring of individuals' lives
and time.
The importance of historical materialism in Harvey's work cannot be overlooked.
Harvey follows closely along with Marx in these regards. We might examine in further
detail the role of history in Harvey's analysis now. In a section of The Condition of
Postmodemity titled, "Time and Space as Sources of Social Power," Harvey offers an
interpretation of Marx's "economy of time." Harvey spells out the connection money has
with value, and the connection value has with labor time in Marxian theory. Harvey
states that the "rise of the money form shaped the meaning of time in important and
specific ways" (1989, p. 227). Citing Le Goff (1980), Harvey continues that the growth
of the money sphere had significant effects on time. Harvey recounts that the circulation
of commercial networks (link to Castells' network society) over space in the early
mediaeval period forced merchants to construct "a more adequate and predictable
measure of time for the orderly conduct of business" (1989, p. 227). This is an important
point of distinction for comparisons with Virilio, who presents a rather different
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conception of history. Harvey characterizes the mediaeval era as one dominated by the
growing economic influence of merchants. Harvey works to support the merchant/time
connection more directly here, citing Landes (1983):
The mediaeval merchant discovered the fundamental concept of the "the
price of time" only in the course of exploring space. Because trade and
exchange entail spatial movement, it was the time taken up by this spatial
movement which taught the merchant to attach prices, and hence the
money form itself, to working time (1989, p. 228).
Harvey implies that it was the mediaeval merchant who discovered the fundament
concept of "the price of time"; time is then for Harvey directly linked in a historical sense
to trade and exchange. Trade and exchange are identified as forms of spatial movement,
and spatial movement naturally takes time. After identifying the mediaeval merchant as
central in the establishment of the time/money connection, Harvey moves on to suggest
that there were two general implications that followed. The first was that: "progressive
monetization of relations in social life transform(ed) the qualities of time and space"
(1989, p. 228). Harvey asserts that a fundamental change in the measurement of time
occurred as a result of the way in which mediaeval merchants conducted business.
Harvey suggests that in combined effort with clocks and bells, merchants conducted
business in a way separate from the "natural" rhythms [compare to Durkheim] of agrarian
life and divorced from religious signification, "merchants and masters created a new
"chronological net" in which daily life was caught" (1989, p. 228).
The second implication Harvey draws from medieval merchants' discovery of
time as money is related to the pursuit of monetary objectives. If money has no meaning
independent of time and space, Harvey posits, then profit can be pursued by altering the
ways time and space are used and defined (1989, p. 229). Harvey explains in greater
detail that within the context of profit-seeking, efficient material commodity exchange
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involves the overcoming of spatial barriers. Overcoming these spatial barriers, however,
requires time and money. Explaining in further detail is Harvey stating that:
Efficiency of spatial organization and movement is therefore an important
issue for all capitalists. The time of production together with the time of
circulation of exchange make up the concept of the "turnover time of
capital." This, too, is an extremely important magnitude. The faster the
capital is launched into circulation can be recuperated, the greater the
profit will be (1989, p. 229).
Not finished here, and following closely with Marx, Harvey argues that spatial
and temporal practices are never neutral social affairs; "They always express some kind
of class or other social content, and are more often than not the focus of intense social
struggle" (1989, p. 239). Harvey argues also that: "Time and space both get defined
through the organization of social practices fundamental to commodity production"
(1989, p. 239). Once again, Marxian theory is obviously present in this analysis.
Harvey's interpretation of "time-compression" may already be clear given his take
on history and materialist leanings. Harvey ties time-compression inextricably to capital
and market processes. Additionally, and with our focus on modernity now, the proposed
shift from Fordism to flexible accumulation is thought to be the major impetus of the
time-compression trend as Harvey has defined it.

With all this, Castells is nearly

indistinguishable from Harvey. Castells starts his empirical investigation of the network
society in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the era when Fordism is thought to have given
way to flexible accumulation. It would not be a stretch to think of Castells' project as an
attempt to empirically and sociologically explain Harvey's theoretical leads.
Summarizing now his materialist conception of time, Harvey wants to make the
nature of time-compression perfectly clear:
I want to suggest that we have been experiencing, these last two decades,
an intense phase of time - space compression that has had a disorienting
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and disruptive impact on political - economic practices, the balance of
class power, as well as upon cultural and social life (1989, p. 284).
And further, Harvey writes:
By putting this condition into its historical context, as part of a history of
successive waves of time-space compression generated out of the
pressures of capital accumulation with its perpetual search to annihilate
space through time and reduce turnover time, we can at least pull the
condition of postmodemity into the range of a condition accessible to
historical materialist analysis and interpretation (1989, p. 307).
Technologies of production and new organizational forms are said by Harvey to
be the primary forces shaping the transition to flexible accumulation. Interestingly, and
in relation to the following discussion of Virlio with his "war model of society," Harvey
also draws attention to the role of military operations. But he quickly dismisses their
importance, returning to the all-encompassing logic of capital and the historic shift
toward flexible accumulation though technologies of production may have originated in
the pursuit of military superiority, "their application had everything to do with bypassing
the rigidities of Fordism and accelerating turnover time as a solution to the grumbling
problems of Fordism-Keynesianism that erupted into open crisis in 1973" (1989, p. 284,
italics mine for emphasis).
Summarily, here again we see the emphasis on "tum-over time," with capital as
the operative force. There is no ambiguity in Harvey's position. Time-value-space
relations have a specific origin in rise of the medieval merchant. Time-compression is a
derivative of these earlier processes, accelerating during the shift toward flexible
accumulation of the 1970s.

In light of Harvey's obviously broad and thorough

understanding of a variety of perspectives related to time in society, his position is even
more resolute. Marx, Harvey, and Castells all adhere to the materialist conception of
history. Beyond a strictly philosophical materialism, Marx's materialism is a materialism
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of conflict and class struggle, rooted in the historical dialectic of Hegel. Marx's historical
materialism is all encompassing. Operating from this same perspective is Harvey and
Castells, who accordingly propose a "materialist conception of time." The materialist
conception of time adheres closely to the materialist conception of history, possessing all
of the same assumptions.
Virilio's Ontological Background
Virilio's writing style and general approach to social theory is unorthodox.
Moreover, he does not consider himself a social theorist, abhorring the title, preferring
instead, "critic of the art of technology." He explains: "just look at what an art critic is to
traditional art, and then substitute technology for traditional art, and you have my
position. It's that simple" (Virilio, 1997a, p. 172). Armitage (2001) describes Virilio's
critical responses to the military, speed, politics, cinema, art, and technology as ethical
and emotional responses to the arrival of technological society.

Armitage (2001)

continues that Virilio is well aware his writings are "often dismissed in terms of
scandalous charges"(p. 224).

From a 1998 interview, Armitage quotes Virilio as

objecting: "there's no tolerance for irony, for wordplay, for argument that takes things to
the limit and to excess" (p. 224). Therefore, the question remains whether Virilio might
be taken seriously outside of France in the English-speaking world. Certainly, the topics
in which Virilio deals are serious. Armitage goes as far as to say: "Virilio's theoretical
position and social sensibilities concerning technology thus remain beyond the realm of
even the critical social sciences. He does not depend on intellectual "explanations" but
on "the obvious quality of the implicit"' (2001, p. 224). Some things are implicitly
obvious; they simply are. Certain events, contemporary or historical, are available to all.
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After identifying such events, Virilio moves directly to their characteristics and
interpretation.
The purpose of the following is to examine in further detail the background of
Virilio's thought. Through this examination Virilio's and Castells' positions will be
further distinguished.

Emphasis is placed on the ideas Virilio utilized in his time

analysis. Before getting to these ideas, a brief review of Virilio's broader project will be
presented. These topics will be covered in the remainder of this section: Virilio's war
model of society; the body in the work of Merleau-Ponty; and the phenomenological
conception of time, its foundations in Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger.
Virilio and the Military Conception of History
War is vital matter of state. It is the field on which life or death is
determined and the road that leads to either survival or ruin, and must be
examined with the greatest care (Sun-Tzu, 2000, p. 73).
War is thus an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will (von
Clausewitz, 2000, p. 264).
Virilio cites the former of these war theoreticians, Sun-Tzu, as the greater
influence, but von Clausewitz often shows up in his writings. It is Sun-Tzu (2000)who
said, "Speed is the essence of war." Virilio has incorporated this axiom into his work,
particularly through his concept of dromology. Hailed as the inventor of the concept
dromology, Virilio presents his dromological argument in Speed and Politics: An Essay
on Dromology (1986).
Speed and Politics is largely original. Through the lens of a military historian,
Virilio synthesizes facts and ideas related to speed, space and geography. While Virilio
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draws upon military theoreticians Sun-Tzu and von Clausewitz, he also references a host
of influential individuals and events, past and present, utilizing a method based on the
obvious quality of the implicit." Reflecting on modem technology, Virilio is apt to raise
questions such as: "What are we to say, for example, of researchers' silence on the role of
the National Security Agency in the history of the development of the Internet?" (2000, p.
109). Additionally, Virilio often presents information such as: "Remember that it was
Eisenhower, when he left the White House, who denounced the military-industrial
complex that he himself had helped to create" (1997a, p. 93). Virilio covers a bit of
ground in writings, but this does not mean the absence of clear arguments.
In his work Virilio stresses a "military conception of history." This conception of
history stands in plain contrast with the materialist history of Marx, Harvey and Castells.
This is not to say, however, that Virilio disregards economic or material processes. This
is, however, to identify Virilio as non-materialist, in the Marxian sense of the word.
Virilio's depiction of the growth of the city and human society is based on a "war
model." An important feature of this war model of history/society is the fortified city:
Thus, according to Virilio, the fortified city of the feudal period was a
motionless and generally unassailable war machine coupled to an attempt
to modulate the circulation and the momentum of the movements of the
masses. As a consequence, the fortified city was a political space of
habitable inertia, the political configuration, and the physical underpinning
of the feudal era (Armitage, 2001, p. 217).
Virilio traces the development of war technologies in arguing that the fortified
city has its origins in combat more than commerce. A question Virilio asks is why the
fortified city disappeared. Here we need to be aware of the spatial and geographic
features of Virilio's theorizing. Presented in his work are the historical developments in
movement/transport, and what Virilio refers to as the modes of destruction (i.e. war
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technologies). Holding firm to the belief that we can make sense of history, Virilio
shapes his arguments around historical facts that are present to all. For example, WWI
and WWII are real events, their occurrence is not a source of empirical debate (certainly,
particular and undocumented events may very well be), but their interpretation and
meaning are. For the most part, the modes of destruction have historically been material.
They have been real ramparts, weapons, tools, devices, etc. We might consider first,
however, the chief immaterial of war identified in Virilio's work: speed. Returning to
Sun-Tzu ("speed is the essence of war"), speed is of course not a material object, but a
relationship between objects. Already, a crude materialist argument is brought into
question through such formulations.
A detailed illustration of the historical and technological developments of the
immaterials of war can be found in A Landscape of Events (Virilio, 2000). Let us
consider a detailed passage from A Landscape of Events that incorporates a number of
ideas relevant to the broader theme of this paper:
Dematerialization of armaments, depersonalization of command,
derealization of the aims of war: the question currently posed by the
"immaterials of war" is central. Having accepted, in the course of past
centuries, the infinite delegation of political and military powers and their
tyrannical concentration, are we about to accept the delegation of the
ultima ratio, the decision to declare war, to expert systems that are alone
capable of reacting in "real time" to other devices of the same kind? An
insane coupling of systems of detection and nuclear release belonging to
opposing camps likely to unleash the apocalypse ...In fact, all things
considered, the apocalypse is no longer nuclear war, but the positive or
negative response that we will bring to the question of automation (2000:,
p. 88).
Presented in this passage is a set of interrelated ideas. Virilio's understanding of
time is not separate from his understanding of history, or as we will see, his
phenomenological understanding of the body and human being. The question of the
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immaterials of war is directly linked, in a spatial sense, to the disappearance of the
fortified city.

And both of these, the immaterials of war and disappearance of the

fortified city, are intertwined with notions of speed, technology, politics, and time. In
unraveling the basics of Virilio's thought, it might be helpful to start with its grounding in
the phenomenological body.
This next section, which examines Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenological
body, is intended to better situate Virilio's ideas and serve as a step toward our discussion
of time. Therefore, this will be a transitory rather than an in depth review of the body in
Merleau-Ponty's work. As a former student of Merleau-Ponty, it is safe to assume that
here is where Virilio draws much of his ontological grounding. An initial point to be
made in regards to Merleau-Ponty is his relation to Marx.

Merleau-Ponty was not

entirely antagonistic toward Marxist theory (this discussion would require its own
review). And surely, the phenomenological approach is not mutually exclusive from the
Marxian approach. Yet, what is certain is that this is a feature of Merleau-Ponty's work
that failed to influence Virilio. Of note here as well are Merleau-Ponty's sociological
ties, which Virlio did not take on, either. However, both of these matters require careful
reading. With these points made we might now tum more specifically to a review of
Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenological body.
Merleau-Ponty and the Body
It is true, as Marx says, that history does not walk on its head, but it is also
true that it does not think with its feet. Or one should say rather that it is
neither its "head" nor its "feet" that we have to worry about, but its body
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xix).
This observation made by Merleau-Ponty comes from Phenomenology of
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Perception (1962), the text we will draw upon for our discussion of the body. The body
is an important concept in phenomenology, and Merleau-Ponty has done a great deal to
expand upon what is meant by this notion. As Virilio's most direct influence, Merleau
Ponty's account of the body is important, and a certain influence on his thought. The
passage above would seem to be suggesting that the feet and head of history can not be
separated. If a walking history is to represent a historical materialism, and a thinking
history a historical idealism, Merleau-Ponty would seem to be arguing that these two
should not be placed up against each dichotomously, but they instead be unified through
the metaphor of the holistic body. Indeed, it was phenomenology's founder Husserl who
had declared: "Only through the empirical relation to the body does consciousness
become real in a human and animal sense, and only thereby does it win a place in
Nature's space and time - the time which is physically measured" (1958, p. 164). The
phenomenological perspective would seem quite opposed then to the Cartesian
mind/body split. Merleau-Ponty argues in concert that psycho-physical events can no
longer be thought of in terms of Cartesian physiology, instead Gestalt psychology is to
take its place. Merleau-Ponty contends that soul and body cannot be thought of through
the mutually external terms of subject and object. Soul and body are rather to be found
together at every instant of existence (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).

Following from this,

Merleau-Ponty argues that phenomenological study is not, as it has often been
characterized, wholly a procedure of idealistic philosophy. Rather, it is an existential
philosophy, adding that "Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" appears only against the
background of the phenomenological reduction" (1962, p. xiv). Taking a step back for a
moment, Heidegger plays a dual role in terms of his influence on Virilio.

Virilio

positively cites Heidegger's writings on technology, but is critical of Heidegger's alleged
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totalitarianism, earnmg him the title of "left-Heideggerian" from Kellner (1999).
Heidegger is also a crucial link in the development of phenomenology and later
existential thought. In a following section we will trace the development of time in the
work of Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger, illustrating their influence on Virilio. Before
getting to this, let us continue with the body.
It is perhaps Polar Inertia (2000) where Virilio most explicitly demonstrates the
centrality of the body in his work. In a chapter from Polar Inertia, titled "Polar Inertia,"
Virilio cites heavily Husserl and his notion of ego-centrism. Utilizing this notion, Virilio
states (somewhat cryptically): "The bodily ego-centricity which today survives the loss
of the original ark (an ark called 'earth' since the acquisition of a ground up above) goes
hand in hand with a temporal ego-centricity in which psychological time definitively
wins out over the time of the constituted world" (2000, p. 76). Merleau-Ponty's focus on
the body might be seen as a furthering of Husserl's notion of ego-centrism, with its
starting place in the human subject.
On the topic of human perception of objects, Merleau-Ponty asks: "Is not to see
always to see from somewhere?" (1962, p. 67). We see objects either by having them in
our visual field or by concentrating on them, explains Merleau-Ponty, and to concentrate
one's eyes on something is to be anchored in it, where surroundings are put in abeyance
as to better see the object. The importance of a corporeal body in this process would
seem rather obvious. Yet, perhaps this may not be so obvious from a purely idealistic
perspective. We might consider here phenomenology's attempt to bring the idealism of
Kant down to earth, as to be explored in greater depth later on. On the topic of vision,
Merleau-Ponty turns his language to landscapes and gaze.
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Virilio takes up this

conversation of vision and the body in The Vision Machine (1994), quoting Merleau
Ponty:
Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least within reach of
my sight, marked on the map of the "I can." Merleau-Ponty pinpoints
precisely what will eventually find itself ruined by the banalization of a
certain teletopology. The bulk of what I see is, in fact and in principle, no
longer within my reach (1994, p. 7, italics in original).
Merleau-Ponty speaks also of the "object-horizon structure," or what might more
simply be referred to as perspective. With perspective/gaze in mind, Merleau-Ponty
continues, "I can therefore see an object in so far as objects form a system or a world ...
" (1962, p. 68). The world is that which encapsulates objects, and objects can not be seen
from a placeless nowhere, they are always to be seen from a somewhere, that somewhere
being a body. Merleau-Ponty explains that to see a single object, is to situate it in a world
of objects, a world that exceeds perceptual experience. When such an object is posited, it
passes from experience to idea, and from the idea "objective" thought is formed
(Merleau-Ponty 1962). Merleau-Ponty characterizes the whole life of conscious thought
by the tendency to posit objects. Yet, he adds that the "absolute positing of a single
object is the death of consciousness, since it congeals the whole of existence" (Merleau
Ponty 1962, p. 71). Merleau-Ponty continues on this point by saying that we must
discover the origin of the object at the very center of our experience, and move beyond
the dilemma of the subject and object. For us he argues, there is an in-itself The body's
perception of objects in the world is implicitly a spatial and temporal process.
Summarily, the body exists in a world where its being unfolds: "Thus, to sum up,
the ambiguity of being in the world is translated by that of the body, and this is
understood through that of time" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 85). With the intent here to
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explore Virilio's ontology of time, showing its differences with that of Castells', we
might now tum to a further examination of phenomenology, perception, being and time.
Virilio's Phenomenological Understanding of Time:
A Focus on Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger
The purpose of this section is to examine the successive work of Kant (17241804),

Husserl

(1859-1938),

and

Heidegger

(1889-1976),

to

illustrate

the

phenomenological (and later existential with Heidegger) conception of time that emerged
out from their work. Merleau-Ponty is the French transmitter of this German tradition to
Virilio. Merleau-Ponty also incorporates temporality heavily into his work, but his
temporal understandings are clearly derived from Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger's line of
thought.

Let us start by examining some important aspects of time in history and

thought.
Greek Time, Christian Time
"One cannot step twice into the same river," said Heraclitus of Ephesus (Clark et
al, 1947, p. 34). Philosophy is said to have arisen from the attempts of Ionian Greeks to
understand and explain the patterns of change they witnessed in the world about them:
Heraclitus recognized the pervasiveness of change in the visible world
while insisting that it be understood in its complexity in terms of an
apparently unchanging law (or Logos), which guided all changes, and
brought them into the unity of the world (Sherover, 1975, p. 3).
As Heraclitus observed change, he also identified a "hidden harmony" in the world of
nature, which he thought to be eternal. Change was for Heraclitus not entirely random,
but instead part of a cyclical process, this cyclical process reoccurring and everlasting.
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In contrast to the cyclical understanding of change advanced by Heraclitus and the
Greeks, later the biblical tradition would proselytize another way of thinking about time
and things temporal. In Judeo-Christian belief, time is not cyclical, but serial, maintaining
linear movement and meaning, direction given by a divine metaphysician (i.e. god).
Despite the obvious difference between the early Greek and Christian conceptions of
time, they also shared a common a paradox explains Sherover (1975):
However disparate these two conceptions of time may have been, they
share in one paradox: the rooting of time in the supratemporal or the
timeless. For the biblical God, who created time and was able to enter into
it and use it, was yet prior to its numbered days. And the Heraclitean
Logos, although continually expressed in the ordered cycles marking the
changes within the world, was yet their governor (Sherover, 1975, p. 4).
As history tells, the Greek and Christian worldviews would fuse during the later
days of the Roman Empire, forming the core of the Western intellectual tradition. With
the combination of these two worldviews, similarities and differences clashed, providing
the basis for the dialectic found in subsequent philosophies. Sherover (1975) argues that
the unified Western heritage, despite its Greek origins, would largely neglect a
consideration of time as concrete change or process. Concrete temporal experience was
subordinated to nontemporal abstractions, concepts, logics, and categories, with these
nontemporal abstractions thought more real than the concrete temporal observations of
experience (1975, p. 5). A distinction between "reality" and "appearance" would be
drawn, with Occidental philosophy for the most part conceiving of time as "appearance"
or illusion.

The ideas of the German idealist Immanual Kant would seem to fit well with the
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Occidental tradition. Kant asserts that the human mind is incapable of knowing the
thing-itself, that we can know only its appearance. In other important ways, Kant also
seems to show signs of remaining Greek, how so to be touched on later. Therefore, Kant
may well represent the fusing of the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions.
In his major work, Critique of Pure Reason, Kant proposes that a priori structures
of the mind are essential in enabling human cognition:
Now such universal cognitions, which at the same time have the character
of inner necessity, must be clear and certain for themselves, independently
of experience; hence one calls them a priori cognitions: whereas that
which is merely borrowed from experience is, as it is put, cognized only a
posteriori, or empirically (Kant, 1998, p. 127).
Independent of experience, a priori structures shape what humans can experience,
and hence know. They are beyond the world of the senses. Under Kant's schema, the
human mind cannot know the world itself, it can only know the world as its a priori
structures dictate. Kant distinguishes between phenomena and noumena, placing that
which we can know within the category of phenomena, and the things themselves within
the category of noumena, which may be thought, but not known. These assumptions are
essential components of Kant's project.

Kant further explains what he means by

transcendental in stating: "I caJl aJl cognition transcendental that is occupied not so
much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general" (1998, p.
133, bolded text in original).
Kant's transcendental idealism places focus on the way the human mind, through
a priori structures, shapes what we know. Likewise, space and time are knowable to
human minds only as human sensibility allows. An understanding of human experience
must then always take into account the human ways of knowing, where experience
cannot be direct, but instead mediated through the sensibilities of the human mind. Kant
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continues: "Those, however, who assert the absolute reality of space and time, whether
they assume it to be subsisting or only inhering, must themselves come into conflict with
the principles of experience" (1998, p. 166). Isaac Newton is one such person who
asserted the absolute reality of space and time; he formulated a time divided into equal
parts uniformly along a line: "Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from
its own nature, flows equally without relation to anything external" (Kern, 1983, p. 11).
Kant rejected Newton's objective formulation of time, which does not accord with his
understanding of a priori cognition. Kant instead presented a subjective time, one where
the inner life of the subject is taken into consideration:
Time is not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an
experience. For simultaneity or succession would not themselves come
into perception if the representation of time did not ground them a priori.
Only under its presupposition can one represent that several things exist at
one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times
(successively) (1998, p. 162).
And further:
Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of
our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of outer
appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a position, etc., but on the
contrary determines the relation of representations in our inner state (Kant,
1998, p. 163).
With emphasis on appearance, Kant's system would seem to correspond well with
the Western tradition and its conception of time. Kant's system of transcendental

idealism and a priori cognition declares not the observation of the actual or real things
themselves, but only their appearance within human sensibility.
Kant has had a tremendous influence on Western philosophy. As will be shown,
two such philosophers to work out from his influence are Husserl and Heidegger.
Husserl is often regarded as the progenitor of contemporary phenomenology, and
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Heidegger, as the student of Husserl, would also work to extend the phenomenological
line of inquiry, but he would later become less an advocate of Husserl's version of pure
phenomenology. Let us tum our attention now to Husserl and his phenomenological
project, showing Kant's influence in the process.
Husserl
In Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Husserl describes pure
phenomenology as a new and essentially unique science; it calls itself a science of
"phenomena" (Husserl, 1958, p. 41). Husserl says that phenomenology is a new science,
but that "the whole course of philosophical development since Descartes has been
preparing the way for it - a science covering a new field of experience, exclusively its
own, that of 'Transcendental Subjectivity "' (1958, p. 11). Remaining transcendental in
form, the science of phenomenology places concern, as Kant did, with the subjective
dimensions of knowing. Husserl's ontology is like Kant's in that it operates with a
similar understanding of transcendental, but a clear distinction between Husserl and Kant
is also to be found. We might remember that Kant, with his emphasis on the subject, held
firm to the idea that we cannot know things as they are in themselves, but only as they
appear to us, conditioned by a priori cognitive structures. Husserl contested however,
that we can know the thing-itself in its unveiling to us. This is an important difference
between Kant and Husserl, and also an important ground upon which phenomenology is
based. Phenomenologists tend to believe that objects in the world can be known through
an "encountering."
Husserl fashioned phenomenology as a philosophic and scientific method.
Practitioners are to set aside presuppositions, hypotheses and suspend natural beliefs.
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Focus is to be placed on the objects of experience, as they are perceived, under the
conditions in which knowledge is possible. Husserl advocated the phenomenological
method by declaring: "Back to the things themselves!" Phenomenology tends to oppose
grand systems of speculative thinking and unobservable matters.

Phenomenology,

however, also tends to oppose strict naturalism and objective positivism.

In Ideas,

Husserl is at points critical of what he refers to as the "unsophisticated standpoint" of
positive reality (Positivitat) (1958). Husserl also questions the taken for granted basis of
being, a theme Heidegger would take up in full force.

Husserl's science of

phenomenology represented a break from the "unsophisticated" methods of positive
empmc1sm, and placed a greater emphasis on the inner life of the subject. Husserl
explains:
It leads eventually to the point that I, who am here reflecting upon myself,
become conscious that under a consistent and exclusive focusing of
experience upon that which is purely inward, upon what is
"phenomenologically" accessible to me, I possess in myself an essential
individuality, self-contained, and holding well together in itself, to which
all real and objectively possible experience and knowledge belongs,
through whose agency the objective world is there for me with all its
empirically confirmed facts, in and through which it has for me at any rate
trustworthy (even if never scientifically authorized) essential validity
(1958, p. 17).
In addressing the criticism that phenomenology, with its emphasis on individual
cognition, is a form of solipsism, Husserl draws attention to the intersubjective nature of
understanding: "It is thus within the intersubjectivity, which in the phenomenological
reduction has reached empirical givenness on a transcendental level, and is thus itself
transcendental, that the real (reale) world is constituted as 'objective,' as being there for
everyone" (1958, p. 22). Husserl's emphasis on the subjective ways of knowing show
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clearly Kant's influence. Husserl also incorporates the concepts and terminology of
Kant's a priori:
All actual experience refers beyond itself to possible experiences, which
themselves again point to new possible experiences, and so in infinitum.
And all this takes place according to essentially definite specifications and
forms of order which conform necessarily to a priori types ....Every
hypothetical construction of practical life and of empirical science is
related to this shifting but ever-present horizon through which the world
thesis receives its essential meaning (Husserl, 1958, p.149).
These statements on human perception and experience clearly come out from Kant. Kant
states similarly:
All possible appearances belong, as representations, to the whole possible
self-consciousness. But from this, as a transcendental representation,
numerical identity is inseparable, and certain a priori, because nothing can
come into cognition except by means of this original apperception. Now
since this identity must necessarily enter into the synthesis of all the
manifold of appearances insofar as they are to become empirical
cognition, the appearances are thus subject to a priori conditions with
which their synthesis (of apprehension) must be in thoroughgoing accord
(1998, p.235).
These passages speak to the way in which perceptions combine with concepts in
the formation of knowledge. Important here is the idea of meaningful knowledge.
According to Kant, the human mind works constantly to synthesize perceptual
impressions with concepts, this in order to make sense of what is perceived in a
meaningful way. Sense impressions are cross-referenced against what one knows to be
possible from past experience, or transcendental logic and reasoning. Here the a priori
element is essential to sense observation. The understanding of a particular event or
thing is not passive then, but instead an active process where perception and conception
are synthesized to inform the subject of what is being perceived, and what might be
perceived in terms of future possibilities. This process is fundamentally temporal: "This
integration is effected by an imaginative synthesis of the sensory report and the
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intellectual concept by means of the one universal characteristic they both manifest,
amenability to temporal form" (Sherover, 1971, p. 255).
Husserl's understanding of human perception and conceptualization is quite
similar then to Kant's. Husserl asserts that an act of consciousness necessarily involves a
relationship between the perceiver and thing perceived. Both subject and object receive
attention under this schema, with a definite leaning toward the subject, with inter
subjectivity the basis of meaningful communication between subjects.
Returning to the temporal aspects of this, Husserl gives priority to the subject's
lived experience of time, or "inner time consciousness," this over that of a uniform,
objective or mathematical experience of time. Phenomenological time is what interested
Husserl, the time involved with the experience and perception of phenomena. Husserl's
interpretation of time explores in particular the constitution of the present. Husserl
conceived of an extended, or "thick" present. The "thick" present is three-dimensional,
incorporating past, present, and future. The past is in necessary connection with present.
The present combines both a distant past which has gone before, and a more recent past,
which takes the form of "retention." According to Husserl, the present is made up of
more than a series of disconnected now-points.

Each point of time involves our

experience of the past, and our "protentions" of the future. When taken together, these
now-points form an interval and temporal duration. Husserl uses the example of sound
and melody to make a convincing point:
"During" this whole flux of consciousness, I am conscious of one and the
same sound as enduring, as enduring now. "Beforehand" (supposing it
was not expected, for example) I was not conscious of it. "Afterward" I
am "still" conscious of it "for a while" in "retention" as having been
(Sherover, 1975, p. 485).
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Important with this is the idea that in human consciousness, points of temporal duration
recede, or fade away. The sound is heard, retained, and fades as its temporal point is
past. Husserl states:
To my consciousness, points of temporal duration recede, as points of a
stationary object in space recede when I "go away from the object." The
object retains its place; even so does the sound retain its time. Its temporal
point is unmoved, but the sound vanishes into the remoteness of
consciousness; the distance from the generative now becomes even greater
(Sherover, 1975, p. 485).
With his discussion of retention (past orientated), and protention (future
orientated), Husserl makes a distinction between retention and memory, and protention
and hope. Retention is not memory, Husserl clarifies, because in memory the past is
experienced as past and not as part of the present. Likewise, conscious thoughts of hope
or expectation toward future events are not part of the present. Rather, retention and
protention are thought to be unconscious in everyday experience, yet, still very much
constitutive of every present moment. Husserl's understanding of time is also directional,
moving always toward the future. Time flows ineluctably toward the future; it is not
reversible. This understanding of the present as constituted by retention and protention is
at the core of Husserl's model of time (Dostal, 1993).
Despite Husserl's emphasis on temporality as a constant theme in his philosophy,
there is an argument (Dostal, 1993) that Husserl did not adequately integrate space and
time into his larger project of phenomenology. Heidegger would come along to take up
this task in greater detail. As the student of Husserl, Heidegger followed very closely
along the phenomenological path laid by its founder. Heidegger would, however, address
time more directly in his writings than did Husserl.

Yet still, on matters of time

Heidegger worked largely out of the intellectual tradition advanced by Kant and Husserl.
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However, Heidegger would also make a clear break, one that would seem to have a
relationship to the Christian and Greek notions of time; time was for Heidegger not
eternal, but finite. The remainder of this section will consider Heidegger's contributions
to study of time, and then show the connection with Virilio.
Heidegger
Heidegger started out very much as a phenomenologist in Husserl's sense,
following much of the same ontological framework of Kant and Husserl. Just as Husserl
proclaimed "back to the things themselves," Heidegger also envisioned a return to the
data of immediate experience in his work. Heidegger would, however, attempt to make
distinct breaks from Kant and Husserl, but his debt cannot be forgotten either.
Acknowledging part of this debt is Heidegger in the introduction of Being and Time,
citing Husserl's influence clearly: "The following investigations would not have been
possible without the foundation laid by Edmund Husserl; with his Logical Investigations
phenomenology achieved a breakthrough" (1996, p. 34). While it is a critique that
Husserl did not adequately develop the temporal end of his project, Heidegger's
investigations proceed in many ways out from similar lines of Husserl's thought. But for
Heidegger, time takes on an even more pivotal role:
In contrast to all this [the history of philosophy], our treatment of the
question of the meaning of Being must enable us to show that the central
problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly
seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case (Dostal,
1993, p. 154).
Heidegger's project starts with the question of being, and temporality is central to
this question. For Heidegger, being takes on a different meaning in comparison to
Husserl and Kant. In drawing out the meaning of being, Heidegger seeks to address the
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deeper ontological question in a way that has not been done prior. Heidegger refers to
this effort as "fundamental ontology," raising being as the most fundamental of questions.
Neither philosophical nor positive investigations have revealed being, and with this point
Heidegger challenges the foundation of positive investigation, much as Husserl did,
questioning the basis and grounds:
We must show that all previous questions and investigations which aim at
Da-sein fail to see the real philosophical problem, regardless of their
factual productivity. Thus, as long as they persist in this attitude, they
may not claim to be able to accomplish what they are fundamentally
striving for at all. In distinguishing existential analytic from anthropology,
psychology, and biology, we shall confine ourselves to what is in principle
the fundamental ontological question (1996, p. 43).
Questioned here is the utility of philosophical and positive investigations that proceed
absent of being. The first half of Heidegger's major work Being and Time is dedicated to
the question of being, the second, being's place in time.

Before jumping into

Heidegger's project of being, let us take a moment to examine briefly his relationship
with Kant on some of these matters.
What is clear is that Heidegger's thinking owes a great debt to Kant, as well as
Husserl. Heidegger cites Kant's contribution to the understanding of time in stating:
"Kant is the first and only one who traversed a stretch of the path toward investigating the
dimension of temporality - or allowed himself to be driven there by the compelling force
of the phenomena themselves" (1996, p. 20). Yet, Heidegger also envisions problems
with Kant's larger work, which he believes neglects the fundamental question of being.
Heidegger holds that Kant dogmatically adopts the position of Descartes:
Despite his taking this phenomenon back into the subject, however, his
analysis of time remains orientated toward the traditional, common
understanding of it. It is this that finally prevented Kant from working out
the phenomenon of a "transcendental determination of time" in its own
structure and function (1996, p. 21).
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It is Heidegger's claim that through his under-treatment of being, Kant remains
"Greek" in his ontology. Here we step on shifty ground, as these matters are detailed,
and lead in many directions - Heidegger himself shows signs of "Greekness" in his
marking of time as finite and historical, rather than eternal (more on this to follow).
Generally though, Heidegger makes this claim because he identifies Kant as following in
the steps of Aristotle and the Greek tradition, which disregard any explicit knowledge or
understanding of time in the formation of being. It is in his under-treatment of being that
Kant remains Greek.
Heidegger's task was to move beyond the limited treatment of being in the works
of Kant and Husserl. Related to the under-treatment of being is the issue of theory and
practice. In a somewhat paradoxical way, early Heidegger reversed the emphasis on
theory and placed it on practice. (This is paradoxical because what is Heidegger doing
here other than theorizing?) Heidegger would attempt to move beyond these earlier
thinkers in part by establishing an altered language and conceptual framework associated
with the concepts of subject and object. Heidegger would not give priority to the subject
in the way that Kant and Husserl (in his ego-centric approach) did. Heidegger worked to
remove the subject/object language, and replace it with the language of Da-sein. Da-sein
is the "there" (Da) where being (Sein) shows itself (Dostal, 1993, p. 153). Heidegger
restricts the overemphasis on the abstract "subject" in Kant and Husserl by placing focus
instead on Da-sein, which is to always take on a historical and embedded meaning.
Heidegger begins to illustrate how Da-sein differs from subject/object here in speaking
about Da-sein in connection with "being-in-the-world":
Because Kant did not see this structure, he failed to understand the full
context of the constitution of a possible orientation. Directedness toward
80

the right or the left is grounded in the essential directionality of Da-sein in
general, which in tum is essentially determined by being-in-the world.
However, Kant is not interested in a thematic interpretation of orientation,
either. He only wishes to show that all orientation needs a "subjective
principle." But "subjective" means here a priori. The a priori of
directionality in terms of right and left, however, is grounded in the
"subjective" a priori of being-in-the-world, which has nothing to do with a
determinate character restricted before hand to a worldless subject (1996,
p. 102).
In this passage Heidegger attempts to show that Kant's subjective understanding
of human sensibility does not fully incorporate what it means for humans to be in the
world.

Heidegger believes that Kant's understanding of human sensibility lacks the

dimension of "worldliness." The idea of worldliness is very important in Heidegger's
argument, as it is essential for a complete understanding of Da-sein. Heidegger considers
Kant, and Husserl as well, to be limited to a traditional understanding of subject and
object, a subject and object that are not given their proper grounding in a temporal and
historical sense. In identifying how Da-sein is temporal and historical, Heidegger adopts
a "pre-ontological" or non-theoretical interpretation (indicative of pre-Platonic/pre
metaphysical Greeks) of entities with a focus on everyday practices. Heidegger argues
that only through abstraction can Da-sein (being-there) be removed from its grounding in
everyday practices. Everyday practices, or what are referred to as "ready-to-hand," are
practices which require little thought on the part of a subject; they are known without
contemplation or any abstract thought (Zimmerman, 1990).
In the first section of Being and Time, "The Exposition of the Task of a
Preparatory Analysis of Da-sein," Heidegger initiates an analysis of Da-sein, stating that:
The being whose analysis our task is, is always we ourselves. The being
of this being is always mine. In the being of this being it is related to its
being. As the being of this being, it is entrusted to its own being. It is
being about which this being is concerned (1996, p. 39)
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Heidegger begins the process of clarifying being in the first section of Being and
Time, where he explains that two things follow from Da-sein: one, that the "essence" of
this being lies in its to be and its existence. A further qualification is made that the
characteristics of this being are not objectively present as "outward appearances" or
attributes, but instead as possible ways to be. Heidegger continues: "Thus the term 'Da
sein' which we use to designate this being does not express its what, as in the case of
table, house, tree, but being" (1996, p. 40). This first point regarding Da-sein seems to
suggest that Da-sein is not concerned with objective beings as objects, but rather how
they are, in their being. Heidegger further explains that with Da-sein, priority is given to
existentia over essentia, or existence over essence.
A second feature of Da-sein is that it is always my own. With this Heidegger is
getting at how Da-sein is owned by a person. Heidegger says that we must always use
the personal pronoun "I am," "you are," when we speak of Da-sein (1996, p. 40).
Da-sein is further explained as a potentiality, or a becoming: "And because Da
sein is always essentially its possibility, it can 'choose' itself in its being, it can win itself,
it can lose itself, or it can never and only 'apparently' win itself' (1996, p. 40).
Additionally with the discussion of Da-sein, Heidegger presents the possibilities
of authenticity and inauthenticity, where inauthenticity is described as not lesser or lower
(a frequent misinterpretation). Authenticity and inauthenticity are linked with notions of
understanding and selfhood: "Understanding is either authentic, originating from its own
self as such or else inauthentic" (1996, p. 137). Heidegger continues by explaining that
inauthentic does not necessarily mean not genuine - both authentic and inauthentic can
be either genuine or not genuine. Authenticity and inauthenticity are also importantly
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related to "falling prey to the world" (1996, p. 164). The possibility of authenticity is
directly related to "falling prey," as is described in further depth below:
What we called the inauthenticity of Da-sein may now be defined more
precisely through the interpretation of falling prey. But inauthentic and
non-authentic by no means signify "not really," as if Da-sein utterly lost
its being in this kind of being. Inauthenticity does not mean anything like
no-longer-being-in-the-world, but rather it constitutes precisely a
distinctive kind of being-in-the-world which is completely taken in by the
world and the Mitda-sein of the others in the they. Not-being-its-self
functions as a positive possibility of beings which are absorbed in a world,
essentially taking care of that world. This nonbeing must be conceived as
the kind of being of Da-sein nearest to it and in which it mostly maintains
itself (1996, p. 164).
Again we return to the idea of being-in-the-world, which is a paramount in the
possibility of authentic being. Yet another concept related to authenticity, being-in-the
world, and worldliness is falling prey (which is also related to care, a concept to be
explored in greater depth later on). Falling prey is an existential mode of being-in-the
world in which Da-sein falls away from itself. Heidegger uses the example of "idle talk"
as a type of falling prey to the world. Idle talk is a being-with-one-another where Da-sein
loses itself to the they, and is hence inauthentic. But again Heidegger is quick to point
out that inauthentic being does not mean stagnation or inactivity, but instead an
uninhibited "busyness." (1996, p. 166). Heidegger argues further that alienation is the
result when Da-sein's own-most potentiality for being-in-the-world is concealed.
Alienation closes off to Da-sein its possibility and authenticity, and forces it into
inauthenticity: "The tempting and tranquilizing alienation of falling prey has its own
kind of movement with the consequence that Da-sein gets entangled in itself' (1996, p.
166).
With the concept of Da-sein at least partially touched on, we can turn our
attention now to the second part of Heidegger's project, that of time. It is Heidegger's
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pursuit of the ontological question of time itself that represents the major break from
Husserl. If we might recall, Husserl viewed time as fundamental, but did not seek an
explanation of it itself (Dostal, 1993, p. 151). Heidegger, despite a separate objective,
still follows Husserl in many ways with his thought on temporality. Heidegger shares
Husserl's understanding of a three-dimensional time. Husserl illustrated well the notion
of a "thick" present, one that moves forward while maintaining through retention and
protection the past and future. Heidegger, with focus on Da-sein, a Da-sein that can be
either authentic or inauthentic, also works with the same framework as Husserl, but the
incorporation of Da-sein may be considered the axial addition.

Important in this

discussion, and associated with a temporal Da-sein, is the component of care. The
concept of care will require further explanation here. With this word, too, our common
understanding of it may cloud the way it is being used by Heidegger.
In part two of Being and Time, in the section "The Authentic Potentiality-for
Being-a-Whole of Da-sein, and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care,"
Heidegger makes an effort to show Da-sein' s temporal nature as connected to care.
Foremost, Da-sein is wholly temporal: "Temporality is experienced as a primordial
phenomenon in the authentic being-a-whole of Da-sein, in the phenomenon of
anticipatory resoluteness" (1996, p. 281). Anticipatory resoluteness, which might be
helpful to define, is described by Heidegger as letting oneself be called forth to one's
own-most toward death:

"It harbors in itself authentic being-toward-death as the

possible existentiel modality of its own authenticity" (1996, pp. 282-283). Anticipatory
resoluteness is a form of care that is authentic. Related to Heidegger's fundamental
ontology, care is given the existential formula: "being-ahead-of-oneself-already-being-in
(a world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered)" (1996, p. 292).
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Care is shown to entail three constitutive moments that bring it together as a
unity, and these three moments correspond with the past, present, and future of temporal
understanding. Here Husserl's influence is apparent. The three moments of care outlined
by Heidegger are: existentiality, facticity, and falling prey. Existentiality corresponds
with being-ahead-of-oneself (future); facticity corresponds with already-being-in (past);
and falling prey corresponds to being-together-with (present). Heidegger, like Husserl,
considers time as always moving forward toward the future with past, present, and future
together as a thick form of "now-time." But Heidegger places even greater emphasis on
the futural than does Husserl; for Heidegger authentic being is always found in being
ahead-of-oneself. Heidegger describes below:
The ahead-of-itself presented itself as a not-yet. But the ahead-of-itself,
characterized in the sense of something outstanding, revealed itself to our
genuine existential reflection as being toward the end, something that in
the depths of its being every Da-sein is. We also made it clear that care
summons Da-sein to its ownmost potentiality-of-being in the call of
conscience. Understanding the summons revealed itself - primordially
understood - as anticipatory resoluteness, which includes an authentic
potentiality-of-being-whole of Da-sein (1996, p. 292).
Heidegger believes that for the most part, Da-sein is not typically found in its
most authentic mode, but rather lost in they-self (being-together-with, or falling prey),
"[t]he they-self is an existentiell modification of the authentic self' (1996, p. 293). This
would mean that in the present, or "now-time," we are most often fallen, according to
Heidegger, and not in anticipatory resoluteness.
In continuing to outline care, temporality, and Da-sein, in Heidegger's project
there is also the importance of "I," where he states: "Saying I means the being that I
always am as 'I-am-in-a-world "' (1996, p. 295). Returning to Kant once more, this is
where Heidegger finds disagreement with Kant's understanding. Heidegger makes
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explicit his difference with Kant in arguing that:
Kant did not see the phenomenon of world and was consistent enough to
keep "representations" at a distance from the a priori content of the "I
think." But thus the I again was forced back to an isolated subject that
accompanies representations in a way that is ontologically quite indefinite
(1996, p. 296).
The I is an important component of the connection between care and selfhood. I
is an I based in the world, not as a radical subject (as in Kant/Descartes), but as a
connected and worldly subject.

Heidegger maintains that I and selfhood must be

connected with the understandings of Da-sein, care, and temporality. Only through a
futural being-ahead-of-oneself in anticipatory resoluteness can one be in the mode of
authentic care.

In the passage below, Heidegger pulls together care, resoluteness,

temporality and Da-sein, while showing how all of these are necessary for an
understanding of being and time. Here again, Heidegger restates the importance of
being-ahead-of-oneself, and with other beings (intersubjectively).

A self is thought

authentic when it moves in time toward what it existentially is to be:
If resoluteness constitutes the mode of authentic care, and if it is itself
possible only through temporality, the phenomenon at which we arrived
by considering resoluteness must itself only present a modality of
temporality, which makes care possible in general. The totality of being
of Da-sein as care means: Ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as
being-together-with (beings encountered within the world). In first
establishing this articulated structure, we referred to the fact that with
regard to this articulation the ontological question had to be taken back
further to the exposition of the unity of the totality of the structural
manifold. The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality
(1996, pp. 300-301).
We might now reintroduce a passage we have already seen from Virilio in a
previous section.

Quoted in length, this passage shows directly Virilio's

phenomenological/existential ontology, and his links to the authors reviewed in this
section. With our review of Merleau-Ponty and the body, and also our review of Kant,
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Husserl, and Heidegger on human sensibility, time, and being now behind us, Virilio's
argument might be easier to situate. In this passage elements of Virilio's war model and
critique of modem technology also show themselves clearly:
Human beings exist in the three dimensions of chronological time - past,
present and future. It is obvious that the liberation of the present - real
time or world time - runs the risk of making us lose the past and future in
favor of a presentification, which amounts to an amputation of the volume
of time. Time is volume; it is not only space-time in the sense of
relativity. It is volume and depth of meaning, and the emergence of one
world time eliminating the multiplicity of local times is a considerable loss
for both geography and history. We are going to witness the accident of
accidents, the accident of time. It is no longer the accident of a particular
time in history like Auschwitz or Hiroshima. Like time, any trajectory also
has three dimensions: past, present and future; departure, voyage and
arrival. No one can be deprived of these three dimensions, either with
respect to time or trajectory, which means that I go toward the other, that I
go to far away places. However, the hyperconcentration of real time
reduces all trajectories to nothing: the temporal becomes permanent
present, and travel - from here to there, form one to another - mere "being
there." Michel Serres calls this the "hors-la" (out there). (Think of the
image of the Horla in literature: it's a phantom.) We are therefore risking
an accident of time that will affect our entire being (Virilio, 1999, pp. 8182).
What Virilio is speaking here to is, firstly, human being as embedded in a thick
present. The thick present we might recall as being the temporal place where past,
present, and future combine in a synthesis of concepts and precepts. A "presentification"
brought on by modem communication, information, and transportation technologies is
believed to threaten the unfolding and volume of time. Time is thought to be amputated
under the conditions of "real-time" or "world-time." The argument is that with such a
dramatic disjuncture between the historical time of Da-sein, and the instantaneous time of
modem technologies, there is bound to be an influence on human being which, according
to the phenomenological perspective, can only be a temporal and situated being. If
technologies of speed are to dominate the social landscape, what might be left of worldly,
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situated human beings? If Da-sein rests on being-in-the-world, what happens when the
world, through significant advances in the speed and pervasiveness of communication
and transportation technologies, is both spatially and temporally much more present?
Might this influence the way time is experienced in human sensibility? Also, if we might
take Heidegger's lead and examine practice, in its full and instrumental entirety, what do
we observe of Da-sein, of being there, where are people now, where is care directed? It
would seem that care is directed closer to computers than ever before.
Conclusion: Two Understandings and Approaches Toward Social Time
What has been the purpose of the forgoing discussion? In one sense, it has been
simply to show that neither Castells' nor Virilio's project is isolated from an intellectual
background.

The main purpose has been to examine more closely the ontological

grounding of Castells and Virilio in order to plainly show two different understandings of
social time. For Castells, to speak of time is to elicit merchants, markets, capital flows
and class conflict. Castells understands time through a materialist conception of history.
For Virilio, to speak of time is to elicit war technology, speed, the body, and human
being. Castells directs his critique toward global capitalism with its emerging logic in
spaceless flows of information through market networks. "Timeless time" is for Castells
tied to market processes and their technologies. Virilio directs his critique toward a
condition of pure war and the military-scientific complex. "Real time" is for Virilio the
implementation of a technological time that has no relationship to historical time.
Through the lens of a military conception of history, Virilio posits that technologies of
speed (often military in origin) impose "dromological" effects on human subjects, based
on a phenomenological/existential understanding of human being.
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With these two understandings of social time, we see both are inextricably tied to
technology. The question then turns to what sorts of technologies? What are these
technologies' origins and functions?

For one theorist we witness a resolutely

materialist/economic model, the other a phenomenological/war model.

As our

comparison/contrast of Castells' and Virilio's writings has shown, these two different
ontological groundings have stylistic and methodological implications. Both theorists
have argued (as we have also reviewed with the work of Durkheim, Sorokin, Spengler)
that social time cannot be subjugated to a strictly objective, mathematical formula;
cultural rhythms and the inner life of subjects need to be taken into consideration.
What distinguishes these projects then?

Materialist and phenomenological

perspectives are not mutually exclusive; they can be combined - as others have done - so
this is not a necessary distinction. Additionally, Marxian theory offers a great deal in
terms of reflecting on the inner life of subjects, as Marx's writings on alienation attest.
However, at issue here is something else, something that distinguishes the empirical
sociological approach of Castells with the difficult to define approach of Virilio. This
something is easily lost in the presentation of charts and tables.
Castells is reliant on a scientific sociology; he assured us this was the only
direction for the new sociology to take.

Sociology has an empirical and positivist

heritage. Sociology studies what might be observed. Sociology is not philosophy. But
where is social theory positioned? Social theory and empirical sociology are connected;
they rely on each other.

Either inductively or deductively, before the fact or after,

sociologists base, interpret, and explain their findings through theory. But what is social
theory? Does social theory not have its foundations in the work of philosophers - Kant
and Hegel being but two philosophers whose influence on social theory goes without
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mention? Given the connection between social theory and sociology, what is to be said
of a sociology based in empiricism alone? If theorizing is an act of realizing, what are
the implications for a purely empirical, theory-less sociology?
This examination has in part tried to show there are aspects of both Castells' and
Virilio's work that are immeasurable through numbers. While both reflect on real world
things, some of these things are immeasurable. Castells does little to account for the
immeasurables in his work.

Virilio, on the other hand, follows Heidegger in the

questioning of technology in its own right, where "the essence of technology is by no
means anything technological" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 4). Out from such an approach, an
approach that takes into consideration the idea of human being, in a phenomenological
sense, we have a means of addressing questions such as that of "time-compression."
Whereas the convinced sociologist might declare that without much to measure there is
not much to examine, the art historian might listen to what Futurist Umberto Boccioni
said of the intention behind his 1913 sculpture, Unique Forms of Continuity in Space: "to
express our whirling life of steel, of pride, of fever and of speed" (Kem, 1983 p. 120) and
suggest there might be something worth looking into.
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CHAPTER V
TIME OF TECHNOLOGY, TECHNOLOGIES OF TIME
"What has the essence of technology to do with revealing? The answer:
everything" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 12).
Attempted within this chapter is a continuation of the comparison and contrast of
Manuel Castells and Paul Virilio and their technology-based writings. Focus is placed
here on some of the actual technologies Castells and Virilio identify as embodying the
modern, or hypennodern age. Before turning to a review of these authors' accounts, and
before outlining in further detail the direction of this section, let us start here by way of
introduction.
As the introductory quote above implies, The Question Concerning Technology is,
for Heidegger, one of revealing. If concealing is the opposite of revealing, might we
envisage our modern technologies as simply having been historically concealed from us?
They are here now, where have they been hiding? What remains hidden?
Heidegger's diagnosis of the modern-scientific-technological age identifies as its
number one symptom a fundamental transformation in thought proposed to have taken
place between the eras of Greek culture and Roman civilization.

Pinpointed is a

rudimentary shift in the understanding and nature of human being. The proposed turn in
the understanding of human being is believed to have had a direct impact on the
unfolding (or Enframing) of events within the West. Tracing the history of thought from
the early Greeks onward, Heidegger links the dual forces of Christian theology and
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Roman Imperialism to the emergence of a fundamentally dissimilar worldview from that
of Western culture prior. As Zimmerman (1990) explains, the emerging worldview was
one centered on "productionist metaphysics."

Following Zimmerman's narration,

productionist metaphysics are based in an instrumental, creative, and highly ordered
understanding of human being. Productionist metaphysics combine the Christian belief
in a single and all-powerful creative and causal agent (i.e. god) with a late Greek/early
Roman conception of being that shifted from an emphasis on essence, to that of existence.
According to Heidegger, it was Plato who initiated productionist metaphysics through his
philosophy of forms (edios). Plato turned being into "beingness," and presencing into
something permanently present, thereby making all things representations of their true or
ideal (transcendental) form. Through Plato's forms, a blueprint for the world of things
was drafted, designating all things a production in the likeness of their ideal and
permanent form. Heidegger identified the distinction between essence (possibility) and
existence (actuality) as an important one in the development of productionist
metaphysics. Essence is that which a thing was already before being produced, existence
its outward appearance. Aristotle is said to have coined the distinction, with existence
increasingly conceived of as the product of a willful cause or manufacturing action
(particularly through the Roman translation of existence from energeia into actualitas).
Heidegger drew a division between the thinking of ancient Greeks such as Heraclitus
who spoke of producing as a "letting-be," and later productionist thought based on cause
and-effect.
creation.

For the early Greeks, techne was a bringing forth, not a manipulative
Expanding upon this idea is Zimmerman, who incorporates techne with

Heidegger's philosophy of being:
Authentic producing, techne, then is not a matter of an "agent" using
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"force" to push material together into a specific form. Rather, it is a
disclosure of entities for their own sakes. This conception of techne is
consistent with Heidegger's contention that the very being of human
Dasein is "care." To exist authentically means to care for oneself, for
others, and for things in an appropriate way. The destructive aspect of
modem technology, then, is directly related to the constriction of human
Dasein's capacity for genuine caring. Alienation from this capacity was,
for Heidegger, the worst kind of "dehumanization" and led to the most
terrible crimes against humans and non-humans alike (1990, p. 230).
Taking a step back now, and apart from whether or not the modem instrumental
scientific-technological age is an "authentic" manifestation of human being (as
maintained above), the question concerning technology remains: is the technological
accumulation having taken place in a seemingly progressive, ostensibly evolutionary
linear fashion across history to be overlooked?
Existing outside the life and death of civilizations, or the rise, ripening and decay
of cultures, are technologies that seem to endure and progress. Technologies often
exhibit a compounding nature; that is, one often (necessarily) precedes another. It need
not challenge the cyclical world-historical thesis of Spengler to take notice of the
enduring character of certain technologies.

Perhaps in the broader scope of world

history, the larger cycle (with inevitable seasons of decline) is not yet visible. Of the
civilizations to have come and gone, such as the Mesopotamians, Egyptians, Chinese,
Indo-Europeans and so on, have any of these civilizations exclusively owned their
technologies? While a culture may to a large degree own its artifacts and their symbolic
meaning, the instrumental nature of technology makes for easy transfer across culture and
civilization.
The purpose of this section is to consider some specific technologies thought to
have direct time implications. Some of the broad questions relating to the social, cultural,
and individual impacts of such technologies will also be raised here. In addition to
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considering some of the specific technologies in a materialist sense, some of the social
and cultural developments having led the way toward the modem age will also be
considered.
Through the work of Kem (1983) some of the formative technologies of the past
will be remembered. The descent of some of these technologies will be examined with a
focus on the era of modernity. Particular emphasis will be placed on the time influence
of these technologies. Alongside the historical review of modernity initiated by Kem, we
will also be considering the future orientated arguments of Virilio and Castells. Virilio
and Castells show similarity in their depictions of the time influencing technologies of
today (and tomorrow). However, as has been argued throughout, there are fundamental
differences in their understandings. Serving here as thematic guides are Spengler's
physiognomic world-historical perspective and Heidegger's question concerning
technology.
Time of Technology: Modernity
The term "modernity" signifies a great number of things. It possesses aesthetic,
literary, cultural, economic, and political connotations. Primary concern here is with
modernity as a historic epoch.

In order to place modernity within a far-reaching

historical frame of reference, we might take a step back for a moment and think in broad
terms.
Thus far, technology (in a broad sense) has been our theme. Technology,
especially over the last fifty years or so, has become nearly synonymous with new. New
technologies are what make the headlines and nightly news while they fill store shelves,
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homes, offices and laboratories. The question: is there anything new under the sun?
would seem to be an easy one. In a certain sense, the question is absurd. From an even
broader astrophysical perspective, the sun itself was once new.
Each of us inherits a unique chronological position upon birth, and in a social
sense, a ready-made world. This is as true individually as it is generationally. The
Sumerians are said to have invented writing in the 33rd century B.C., the Chinese perhaps
independently in the 19th century B.C. Is Chinese wood-block printing of the 6th century
A.D. a possibility without the antecedent development of writing? Is today's internet
possible without yesterday's telephone and cable networks? The sequential development
of certain technologies in history is obvious. And as Spengler realized, some of these
technologies were to have a serious temporal impact:
In the Classical world years played no role, in the Indian world decades
scarcely mattered; but here the hour, the minute, even the second is of
importance. Neither a Greek nor an Indian could have had any idea of the
tragic tension of a historical crisis like that of August, 1914, when even
moments seemed of overwhelming significance (Kern, 1983, p. 259).
The year 1914 highlighted above by Spengler marks an unprecedented and
unfathomable event to anyone having lived prior to the dawn of electronic
communication. Between July 23 and August 4, the days preceding WWI, world leaders
would give five ultimatums with short time limits all implying or explicitly threatening
war if opposing demands were not met, recounts Kern (1983). Kern remarks upon the
moment in history:
A great many factors led to the breakdown of peace, but the sheer rush of
events was itself an independent cause that catapulted Europe into war.
The kind of temporal precision that Spengler saw in retrospect as unique
to this period was particularly evident in German Secretary of State
Jagow's adjustment of the exact hour for delivery of the ultimatum (1983,
p. 262).
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Spengler gave witness to the direct impact technologies such as the telegraph
would have on political and social life as well as human perception. Is it possible for one
born with modem consciousness to repossess a pre-modem consciousness? Unlikely; a
camping trip without a telephone, television, or computer does little to remove the reality
of modem technologies or the place they hold in our minds. Global communication and
information networks exist independently of any one individual's decision to forget or
escape them. Such realities give modernity its form and character.
In classical sociological literature, and in the work of Max Weber in particular,
modernity is often typified by rationalization and disenchantment. One of the first to
proclaim the disenchantment of the Western world was Nietzsche. Nietzsche turned
Western (Judeo-Christian) metaphysics upon its head by declaring: God is Dead.

A

close reading of Weber shows Nietzsche's direct influence. Therefore, if we are capable
of deciphering Nietzsche's declaration in its full sense, we already understand what is
meant by disenchantment.
Disenchantment signifies a loss of the otherworldly and magical in everyday life
and practice.

Rates of religious attendance do not directly address the question of

whether or not God throws lightening bolts, or metaphysical questions such as whether or
not Gods control fate or are destined by fate (as the Greeks believed).

These are

important questions in relation to Weber's notion of disenchantment, and important as
well to the idea of secular modernity.
In a functioning modem society of the Western variety, day-to-day secular
activities take on a greater importance relative to religious or spiritual ones. Weber's
identification of a Protestant Ethic based in worldly-asceticism offers some support for
such claims.

The West does not stop work five times a day to pray, nor does it
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encourage monastic expressions of life and belief. From these examples we see that
disenchantment and rationalization are closely related. The functioning society rests
upon purposive-rational behavior and a division of labor.

Commenting somewhat

negatively on functioning in a general sense is Heidegger who had said: "Everything is
functioning. This is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything is functioning and that
the functioning drives us more and more to even further functioning, and that technology
tears men loose from the earth and uproots them" (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 199).
Efficiency, specialization, and technical knowledge are components of an
instrumental modem world.

In addition to rationalization and disenchantment,

widespread bureaucratization is often upheld as another signifier of the modem age.
Weber studied the nature of modem bureaucracy through the development of ideal types.
Weber's ideal types pointed to characteristics such as strict rules, laws, and
administrative hierarchy. From these, it is not difficult to envision modem bureaucracy
as an iron cage, as Weber commented, with each individual a cog in a larger machine.
Stemming out from this line of thought, the modem world is fashioned as a
different sort of world, and modem man a different sort of human. Continuing this
theme, what else might distinguish the modem from the pre-modem world? In terms of
communication, one of the distinguishing features of the pre-modem and modem world
would seem to be communication's rate and pace. From a layman's perspective, spoken
and written language had not undergone any drastic changes during this period. Then it
would seem not to be communication itself that has changed, but its speed: the pace of
transmission and interaction. Speed is an important feature of modem times not only in
terms of communication, but also in terms of actual movement and transportation, an idea
to be returned to.
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In staying with the topic of modernity and its distinguishing characteristics, for
Spengler, modem man was an obsessive clock-watcher, haunted by abbreviation,
dynamics and change.

Conrad (1998) comments: "Modem times, accepting the

prospectus of technical innovation, presented human beings with an ultimatum: change,
or trudge off to extinction like the dinosaurs" (p. 401). Conrad continues:
We are into overtime; ours is "a late life." The span of that life
remorselessly contracted as Spengler compressed centuries into a single
year, situating the contemporary West in the cycle of seasons: "we are
born as men of the early winter." Even more alarmingly, the annual cycle
imploded into one foreshortened day. Greek culture, sunny and lucid,
represented for Spengler "the scene of the morning," and he called the
Ionic column "the instrument of high noon," Gothic, in the middle period,
favored mist and fog, dusky half-light. Modem times exhibited what
Spengler described as "the art of the night," longing to be "back in the
darkness of proto-mysticism, in the womb of the mother, in the grave"
(Conrad, 1998, p. 32-33).
A clear and obvious example of man pushed into overtime is the incorporation of
scientific management into material production. In a dual sense, scientific management
is representative of culture and man on fast forward. In terms of production and creation,
scientific management is the opposite of "handicraft," or a creative producing. Under the
mode of scientific management, there can be no inventive breaks from the logic of the
assembly line. Scientific management, or Taylorism, combines cultural developments in
rationalization with material-technical innovation and is a constitutional component of a
modem productive society:
Factory work was accelerated by applying Frederick W. Taylor's
"scientific management," which he first conceived in 1883. Taylor
observed skilled workers and determined the exact series of elementary
operations that make up their job, selected the quickest series, timed each
elementary operation with a stop-watch to establish minimum "unit
times," and reconstructed jobs with composite times as a standard.
Although there was nothing new about cracking the whip, scientific
management was, as the name implied, scientific, or at least systematic,
and avoided the caprice of a foreman's shifting moods (Kem, 1983, pp.
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115-116).
Kem acknowledges m the last sentence of the passage above that there was
nothing new about cracking the whip in order to increase production. Additionally, and
given a deeper historical perspective, Taylor's time management studies of 1883 were not
entirely novel.

While in the production setting Taylor's development of scientific

management would, indeed, seem to be a new development, in the context of war time
management it had long been studied and employed. The length of time it took for a
soldier to reload a weapon was an important concern for Maurice of Nassau and the
Dutch Republic of the mid to late 16th century. Further, it has been argued that Maurice
of Nassau's time management techniques were predated by twenty years in the East by
Oda Nobunaga, a Japanese warlord who experimented with the time dimensions of
musketry in the 1560's (The European Voyages of Exploration, 2003, p. 3). In fact, and
returning to Weber and the notion of modem bureaucracy, it is the war dimensions of
modem bureaucracy that are often overlooked. Dandeker (1990) offers a far-reaching
historical account of the primacy of war in the expansion of modem bureaucracy.
Working to extending Weber, Dandeker concisely states:
The bureaucratization of military power has, then, been an important
aspect of the rise of the modem nation-state. War has been perhaps the
most significant motive for the formation of the modem-nation state in the
west, and military organization its most crucial arm, particularly of course,
in the field of external relations (1990, p. 58).
Dandeker provides a history of the modem nation-state that is far from
economically determined. Just as Virilio suggests that the origins of the city and nation
state require further consideration beyond that of a narrow focus on market-economy, so
does Dandeker. Yet, neither overlook industrial capitalism's role in the rationalization
and bureaucratization of modem society. Simply, Dandeker does not place economics as
99

the lone force in the formation of the modern nation-state.

Dandeker views the

bureaucratization of military power in the west as "symbiotically" connected with the
development of the capitalist economic system. He adds that the technical, financial, and
organizational resources of commercial and industrial enterprises fueled the expansion of
military power. These resources of the capitalist system were channeled into state and
military activities through loans and the tax system.

What is clear in the line of

theorizing that Dandeker presents is that the state takes primacy through its directorial
role:
State direction of the capitalist economy involved the co-ordination of an
administered economy run by committees of businessmen working in
conjunction with the armed forces and the trade unions in industry. This
burgeoning military-industrial complex flourished in all of the great
powers (1990, p. 104).
The monumental tum in the history and development of the nation-state came
during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, during what Roberts (1958)
refers to as the "military revolution." During this time the foundations of the modern
armed forces as a professional and bureaucratic organization were laid.

Dandeker

explains that up until this point military systems were largely comprised of autonomous,
self-equipped mercenary formations. But with state initiated changes, these relatively
autonomous mercenaries would be become "professional servants of the state, disciplined
in a bureaucratic hierarchy and owing allegiance to the state alone" (Dandeker, 1990, p.
57). Along with the revolution in military affairs, the state needed a means of organizing
and regulating the emerging military arm. Bureaucratization was the answer. Dandeker
directly links the bureaucratization of military power with the rise of the modern nation
state. It is important here to remember the essential role that industrialization and the
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growth of capitalism played, which brought dramatic changes to the entire structure of
society.
The preceding examples of growmg disenchantment, rationalization and
bureaucratization represent some of the cultural turns to have led out from a technical
rational, or "productionist metaphysics" worldview. Weber linked such a worldview to
the Protestant work ethic, others with the Enlightenment and the spread of a scientific
empirical framing of the world, and Heidegger with the transformation from Greek
culture to Roman civilization.

But none of these historically specific examples

necessarily points the way or maps the path of human accession from Oldoway gorge to
modernity.
Technologies of Time

With some of the features of a culture of rationalism considered, we might now
look to some of the specific technologies emerging roughly near the tum of the 20th
century. Following closely the work of Kem and his wide-ranging study, The Culture of
Time and Space: 1880-1918, we will review some of the technologies of this era through
the categories of past, present, and future, just as Kem does. Here past, present and
future are used in their experiential sense, with certain technologies thought to have an
influence on the perception of the past, others more on the present, and so on. Of course,
many of the technologies to be discussed possess the potential to impact the experience of
all three time dimensions.
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Past
"The beast has only the future, but man knows also the past," remarked Spengler
(1926, p. 167). How do we know the past? By what means? Outside of individual
memory, human beings have long relied on externalized symbols to help with both
individual and collective memory. In the distant human past (or not so distant depending
on historical perspective), humans of the early Stone Age, 15,000 B.C. improved their
memory by symbolizing in the cave chambers of Lascaux, France. Oral history was
another way for early humans to remember. Early man remembered through both visual
and oral symbols. Speaking of our more recent history, Kern states that:
Two inventions brought the past into the present more than ever before,
changing the way people experienced their personal past and the collective
past of history. The phonograph, invented by Edison in 1877, could
register a voice as faithfully as the camera could a form. The two
provided direct access to the past and made it possible to exercise greater
control over what would become the historical past (1983, p. 38).
In the grand scope of world history, the phonograph and the camera are two very
recent inventions; their impact on daily life has been nothing less than dramatic. Before
considering some of the modern shapes of these technologies, we might try to think back
to a time when neither of these existed, to a time when exact visual and audio
reproductions were simply impossible. It was declared earlier that such a mental exercise
was next to impossible, but we might still try to think about the shock of hearing a
recorded voice or seeing a picture for the first time.
Social reaction during this era was not entirely positive, however. G.S. Lee was
quite disturbed by it all. In 1906 he wrote The Voice of the Machines, a work Kern refers
to as a "rapturous eulogy of technology." The title refers to the phonograph, "which
enabled man to speak 'forward' in time to the unborn and listen 'backwards' to the dead"
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(Kern, 1983, pp. 38-39). Today, through the magic of computer digital audio, human
speech can be created from scratch.
With this discussion we should avoid thinking only in terms of modernity. The
photograph, for instance, has a history that some historians trace back to Giovanni
Battista della Porta and his description of camera obscura in writing in 1553. Even
Niepce's first photograph of 1826 predates the era of Kern's study. But what is important
here is the social impact that the camera and the later cinema would have during this time
period of 1880 to 1918.

Providing an example, Kern chronicles the formation of

photographic record societies unique to this period.
Advancing this same discussion, the cinema, which is dependent of course upon
the earlier invention of photography, represents perhaps the most complete recollection of
the past through visual images.

A counter argument might be made that theatrical

performance and the ritual reproduction of acts has been around since at least the early
days of Greek tragedy, dating back as far as 458 B.C. But, theater is not cinema. With
theater the sounds and movements of actors fade away just as those of any other person
moving through time; through cinema they are captured. Kern cites Hugo Mlinsterberg
who spoke of cinema as an "objectivation of our memory function" (1983, p. 39). Both
still and moving pictures preserve the past in ways that theatre and painting simply
cannot.
The influence on these inventions altered society in irreparable ways. A small
portion of the population, portrait artists, without a doubt lost some business to
photographers.

Some people/artists questioned the very reality of photographs.

Recounted below is a discussion between Paul Gsell and Auguste Rodin, one with certain
technology and time implications, with photography being compared to art:
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[Rodin says:] "People in photographs suddenly seem frozen in mid-air,
despite being caught in full swing: this is because every part of their body
is reproduced at exactly the same twentieth or fortieth of a second, so there
is no gradual unfolding of a gesture, as there is in art."
Gsell objects, "So, when art interprets movement and finds itself
completely at loggerheads with photography, which is an unimpeachable
mechanical witness, art obviously distorts the truth."
"No," Rodin replies, "It is art that tells the truth and photography
that lies. For in reality time does not stand still, and if the artist manages
to give the impression that a gesture is being executed over several
seconds, their work is certainly much less conventional than the scientific
image in which time is abruptly suspended ... "(1994, pp. 1-2).
At issue here is the reality of human perception. Even with running film, do the
events on the screen or in home movies ever look the same or as real as they do in
perception? Reality does not always appear as it does on the movie screen. Perhaps
sometimes it does, during ecstatic, confused, or volatile moments, but this would seem to
point exactly to what may be the unreality of the moving picture. Utilizing advances in
digital imagery, motion pictures such as the Matrix (1999 & 2003) have introduced time
altered sequences, where time slows, accelerates and stands still. Yet, the unfolding of
human perception in time is fundamentally different from any cinematic reproduction.
The question remains: which tells the truth - human perception or an unimpeachable
mechanical witness? If the latter of these is the truth-teller, what are the implications for
human cognition (in a Kantian sense) and ever knowing the ding-an-sich?
Present
The phonograph and the photograph are two inventions that help retrieve the past.
Now we tum attention to some of the early modem technologies to have a direct impact
on the present.. To restate, this is not to say that these technologies are not related to all
dimensions of time, without question there is crossover.
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With the discussion of the present, we might recall our prior review of Husserl,
and his arguments pertaining to the "thick-present." Utilizing the idea of the thick
present, human apprehension is thought to be a temporal process that combines all three
time dimensions, the past, present and future into a single (thick) moment of perception.
Kem identifies the night of April 14, 1912 as an important one in human history.
This is the date the Titanic, a short-lived symbol of human technological prowess and
progress itself, sank. Beyond the historical significance of this ship as a technology are
the events taking place while this ship was sinking. The technology of wireless
telegraphy made this tragic event a tragedy for a great many more people (in the moment)
who were nowhere near the icy waters where the ship went down. Kem recounts the
sequence of events:
The captain determined that they were going to sink at 12:15 A.M.ordered
his wireless operator to send the distress call. Within a few minutes the
airwaves were rippling with signals as over a dozen ships became aware of
the disaster.
Ten ships heard the call from over a hundred miles away and
remained in contact but were too distant to help ...
The operator on the Carpathia got the call for help when he put on
his earphones to verify a "time rush " (an exchange of time signals with a
neighboring ship to see if their clocks agree). At 1:06 A.M. he heard the
Titanic tell another ship coming to help, "Get your boats ready; going
down fast on the head." The world began to get news of the disaster at
1:20 A.M., when a wireless station in Newfoundland picked up the
message that the Titanic was sinking ... (1983, p. 66).
The laying of the telegraph cable across the Atlantic Ocean in 1866 marks an
unprecedented step toward global interactive simultaneity. By 1912 this technology was
a fiimly established feature of modem social life in the West. If the telegraph represents
one level of interactive simultaneity, the telephone represents another. The telephone
emerged in 1876, its progenitor, Alexander Graham Bell. The telephone is so ubiquitous
in every day life today that even to mention its "social impact " is an act of banality. Still,
105

we might try to remember the days before the telephone in an attempt to fully appreciate
the dramatic impact that some of the technologies had on society and individuals.
The telephone possesses the ability to place two distant individuals in the same
place at the same time. Spatially, this is of course impossible, but what this technology
does is connect two (or more) voices in unison. The telephone represents a monumental
advance in simultaneity. Prior historical examples of communication at a distance did
not allow for the same degree of simultaneity or interaction; time is what matters. With
the telephone also came the first instances of mass broadcast. Shortly after its invention
in 1876, the telephone soon became a tool for broadcasts such as religious sermons in the
United States (1879) and concerts in Zurich (1880) (Kem, 1983).
The telephone presented early journalistic potential as well. News stories could
now travel much faster, expanding the knowledge of regional and even world events far
beyond their local occurrence.

Modem technologies such as the telephone aided

journalism, but the social reaction was not always positive, as Kem comments:
Already in 1892 the indefatigable alarmist Max Nordau complained that
the simplest village inhabitant has a wider geographical horizon than the
prime minister of a century ago. If the villager reads a paper he "interests
himself simultaneously in the issues of a revolution in Chile, a bush-war in
East Africa, a massacre in North China, a famine in Russia." Nordau
anticipated that it would take a century for people to be able "to read a
dozen square yards of newspapers daily, to be constantly called to the
telephone, to be thinking simultaneously of the five continents of the
world" without injury to the nerves (1983, p. 70).
Have the nerves been injured by such events as the passage above would suggest?
The theme of accident potential will be highlighted later in this review; the "generalized
accident" is a centerpiece of Virilio' s work. While still on the topic of the telephone, and
also thinking of accidents, we might skip ahead a bit and ponder the telephone's
hypennodem incarnation, the cell phone, and its well-known accident.
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There is an accident implicit to the cell phone; an avoidable accident, one
stemming from thoughtlessness or a simple disregard for others, but an accident
nonetheless: the phone's ringing at the wrong time and place. Such ringing has already
become an inescapable feature and side-attraction of weddings, funerals, classrooms,
sporting events, and just about anywhere else people gather.

There is something

particularly disrupting about the ringing of the personal phone in public places, a
disruption that may exceed the noise it makes. The ringing forces a break in the event,
while it dissolves its ultra-local character. Invading is a distant (or not so distant) other.
In ritualistic settings or places of worship the ring can be devastating.
Future/Speed
The telephone has a clear time impact on the present, but it also has futural
aspects as well. Kem expands: "In comparison with written communication or face-to
face visits the telephone increased the imminence and importance of the immediate future
and accentuated both its active and expectant modes, depending on whether one was
placing or receiving a call" (1983, p. 91). The telephone may ring at any time; it is a
disruptive surprise that demands immediate attention or an active ignoring. Next, more
technologies of modernity will be presented through the conceptual category of speed.
"Speed is not a phenomenon, it is the relationship between phenomena" (Virilio,
2002, p. 4, italics in original). It was not all that long ago that the bicycle represented a
breakthrough in transportation technology, a clear testament that a lot has changed in a
relatively short period of human history. Conrad (1999) remarks:
The bicycle mobilized the pedestrians of the lower middle class; a witty
commentator referred to the 1890s as the "fin de cycle." H.G. Wells
pedaled ambitiously around London, and a French inventor marketed the
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Decuplette, a bicycle for ten riders who, when mounted, resembled a
scurrying centipede. The surrealist Alfred Jarry made the bicycle a vehicle
on which the superman could transcend moral limits (Conrad, 1999, p.
91).
Kem adds that the French writer Paul Adam wrote that the bicycle "created a 'cult of
speed' for a generation that wanted 'to conquer time and space"' (1983, p. 111).
Advocating such a conquering was the radical avant-garde collective known as the
Futurists. The Futurists proclaimed a "new aesthetic of speed," and would push this
proclamation to its limits. While largely an artist and aesthetic collective, the Futurists
would share ties with the politics of Benito Mussolini and Italian Fascism. Filippo
Marinetti was this movement's early and loudest spokesperson.

Marinetti and like

minded cohorts called for a revolutionary overtaking of all things past: "We cooperate
with mechanics in destroying the old poetry of distance and wild solitudes, the exquisite
nostalgia of parting, for which we substitute the tragic lyricism of ubiquity and
omnipresent speed" (Kern, 1983, p. 119).
The advantages of speed are obvious, but so are its dangers. For instance, in
Virilio's thought one cannot speak of the train without also speaking of derailment. Kern
tells of the Highways and Locomotives Act of 1878 in England that required that any
vehicle using public roads be preceded by a man on foot and not exceed a speed of four
miles per hour. The act would be overturned by another of 1896, one allowing for yet
faster "light locomotives." But with the increase in the number of traffic accidents, Kem
tells that some social opposition rose. In 1903 C.S. Rolls argued against such opposition,
making the logically suspect statement: "Our hereditary instincts are shocked at seeing
anything on the road faster than a horse, but as our senses become educated we shall
recognize the fact that speed of itself is not dangerous but the inability to stop is
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dangerous" (Kem, 1983, p. 113). Kem tells that Parliament was not persuaded by such
logic, and in 1904 imposed a speed limit of 20 miles per hour on public highways. Kem
continues: "The number of traffic fatalities in London increased from 769 in the period
1892-1896 to 1,692 in the period 1907-1911" (1983, p. 113).
As some segments of society reacted to these numbers of death by speed in
horror, the Futurists revered the acceleration. The Futurists denounced history, old age,
and anything lasting, these being the inversion of a vibrant and accelerated living.
Conrad adds:

"Marinetti's crash (referring to 1909 high speed race through Milan)

confirmed his valor. To anticipate the future was to will your own obsolescence. In the
Futurist Manifesto, Marinetti boasted that he and his contemporaries would be
slaughtered by 'younger and stronger men' before they reached middle age" (1999, p.
96). Marinetti outlived his prediction, living until 1944, but his colleagues artist/sculptor
Umberto Boccioni, and architect Antonio Sant'Elia were killed right on time according to
their Manifesto, in 1916 during WWI; "war after all was 'the world's only hygiene,'
redefined in a 1915 manifesto as 'Futurism intensified "' (Conrad, 1999, p. 96).
The Futurist's project would extend beyond their aesthetic agenda. Yet, perhaps
it is in error to claim that the Futurists had any influence at all in a causal sense. One
might as easily argue that the Futurists simply offered a radical reflection of their times,
the mechanical age. Others keen to the times, those who made their trade politics rather
than art, saw opportunities with the new technologies of speed and mobility:
... the dictators co-opted the aesthetics of the machine age. Mussolini
realized that ideas needed to be backed up by ammunition: he called
propaganda "my best weapon." Hitler too understood the strategic
importance of mobility: the future, he predicted in Mein Kampf, would
bring about "the general motorizing of the world." A motorized world, as
he well understood, was already a militarized one: the new autobahns
would carry his troops into the countries he wished to annex (Conrad,
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1999, p. 247).
Hitler, as Conrad states above, organized the construction of the autobahns
throughout Germany during his reign. The military importance of transport systems such
as the autobahn goes without question.

With military imperatives also in mind,

Eisenhower would follow in Hilter's lead through the expanded construction of U.S.
highway systems (Conrad, 1999).
Other important technologies of this time with direct distance and speed
implications were the airplane and train. With the growing production of automobiles,
trains and airplanes, the experience of distance, speed and location were dramatically
altered. The remainder of this section is dedicated to an examination of some of today's
technologies, as envisioned by Castells and Virilio.
Castells and Virilio: Technologies of HyperModernity
We turn once again now to the work of Manuel Castells and Paul Virilio. Here
focus is placed on some of the specific technologies these authors identify as embodying
the hypennodem age.
To re-state, the primary purpose of this section is to review the hypothesized
influence of certain technologies on the nature of social time. With this as the primary
purpose of this section, what was the point of reflecting on world history and the essence
of technology? What do these things have to do with today's technologies? The answer:
a lot.
Today's technologies cannot be separated from yesterday's technologies; they
have not grown from nothing or nowhere. The history of technology is important. A
thorough review of this history requires an expansive rather than a specific focus. If it is
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the task of sociology to attend only to detail, granted, this sort of task may not be
sociological. With legitimization increasingly on the side of specialization, it would
seem as though the mainstream of the discipline has all but written off theorizing on an
expansive scale.
Prefiguring any examination, detailed or not, is a source of grounding.

An

attempt has been made here to provide such grounding, both in terms of history and
thinking. Within this section a sweeping and far from detailed survey of history has been
presented. Following from this we might now review some of the time influencing
technologies Castells and Virilio identify in their work. Very little really needs to be said
here in terms of identification. For the most part these are technologies we are already
familiar with; they are already a nearly inescapable part of hypennodem life.
Castells and Technologies of Time
We have reviewed elsewhere the features of Castells' network model of society.
These features inform Castells' identification of today's technologies of time. In The
Rise of The Network Society, Castells bases much of his account of the "Models, Actors,
and Sites of the Information Technology Revolution" in Silicon Valley (1996, p. 53).
Silicon Valley represents for Castells a hub of material technological frenzy: "If the first
Industrial Revolution was British, the first Information Technology Revolution was
American, with a Californian inclination" (Castells, 1996, p. 53). The argument here is
that in starting with Silicon Valley, Castells has already set himself off on a path of
technological shortsightedness.

The passage below identifies a number of specific

technologies believed to have initiated informationalism. Informational capitalism is at
the center of Castells' network model of society. Castells states:
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As I have already mentioned, it was in Silicon Valley that the integrated
circuit, the microprocessor, the microcomputer, among other key
technologies, were developed, and that the heart of the electronics
innovation has beat for four decades, sustained by about a quarter of a
million information technology workers (1996, p. 53).
As mentioned elsewhere, Castells considers the 1970s to represent a marked shift
in market capitalism. The connections between Castells and Harvey have already been
identified. Castells' and Harvey's post-Marxian take on the primacy of the market in
altering geography, space and time has been reviewed. With his account of some of the
actual technologies of the network society, Castells does not step outside of this
conceptual footing. Castells does on occasion mention processes that are not entirely
market based or materialist, but as has been the argument throughout, this does not
change the logic of his network model. Castells remains insistent on the primacy of the
transnational market. Even despite his own statements such as these:

And:

Even in the US it is a well-known fact that military contracts and Defense
Department technological initiatives played decisive roles in the formative
stage of the Information Technology Revolution, that is, between the
1940s and the 1960s (Castells, 1996, p. 59).
Thus, the state, not the innovative entrepreneur in his garage, both in
America and throughout the world, was the initiator of the Information
Technology Revolution (Castells, 1996, p. 60).

If this is the case, as Castells acknowledges himself, why not dedicate analysis to the
State and Defense Department's role in technological initiatives and development? One
is left to wonder, because what we find is not an analysis of either the Defense
Department or the State, but instead a study of the stateless, spaceless transnational
market. Castells continues here more characteristically of his larger project:
Indeed, since the early 1970s, technological innovation has been
essentially market driven: and innovators, while still often employed by
major companies, particularly in Japan and Europe, continue to establish
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their own businesses in America and, increasingly, around the world. This
gives rise to an acceleration of technological innovation and a faster
diffusion of such innovation, as ingenious minds, driven by passion and
greed, constantly scan the industry for market niches in products and
processes (1996, p. 60).
This is a very important passage for the argument presented here. Castells, even despite
his acknowledgment of the essential role played by State and Defense institutions in
technological innovation and creation, remains materialist in his overriding analysis of
technology and society. This same point has been returned to repeatedly for a reason. By
giving precedence to information capitalism, the space of economic flows and their
integrating networks, the logic of capitalist institutions residing over all else, what results
is a limited perception and understanding of technology in a full sense. What this leads to
is a shaping of the technologies of time as overwhelmingly technologies of the capitalist
market. Today's technologies, the technologies at the core of Castells' "network" - the
integrated circuit, the microprocessor, the microcomputer, etc. - are thought of as the
material basis for the new mode of informationalism. Castells' analysis combines these
material and informational technologies with the capitalist restructuring taking place
during the 1970s.

According to Castells, it is from these major events - (1) the

development of new informational technologies and (2) restructuring of the capitalist
mode of production - that we have a new "network society." With these two antecedents
identified as preceding the network society, Castells' account is largely causal. This to
be further reviewed after the following considerations.
Addressing now the time implications of Castells' network model, it is the
informational mode and what Castells refers to as its "culture of real virtuality" that are
suspected of having radical implications for the social organization of time (Bromley,
1999).

Castells argues that the informational technologies of the network society
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promote a condition of "timeless time." Timeless time is connected with the "space of
flows," which undermine the space of places.

Resulting then, and remembering

Harvey's influence, is a hypothesized breakdown of the social processes of localities in
accord with the dominating and imposing nature of capitalist network structures. Castells
expands: "Now, organizational, technological, and cultural developments characteristic
of the new, emerging society, are decisively undermining this orderly lifecycle without
replacing it with an alternative sequence" (1996, p. 446).
There are winners and losers within Castells' model.

There are elites who

operate, control and interact within the network and their counterpart, the masses, who
are "interacted" against and enclosed within the fragmented space of places (Bromley,
1999).

If it seems as though very little has been said here about the actual nature of

networks, that is just what Bromley (1999) contends; Castells himself says very little
about the nature of networks. What are they exactly? That depends on whether we are
referring to economic, political, cultural, or criminal networks, all of which Castells
comments on within his work. When it comes down to the description of an actual
network, Castells remains vague. Yet, we might afford some analytic abstraction here
with a "network" being an ideal type of sorts.
Another important aspect of Castells' project in total and a source of critique is its
causal basis. According to Castells, the new society emerges in the 1970s, and it is
shaped by informationalism and transnational capitalism. Van Dijk argues that Castells'
causal framework shows signs of rigid and deterministic thinking:
One of the author's most important causal claims is the effect of
informationalism (a mode of development) on capitalism (a mode of
production). It rejuvenates capitalism and it brings statism to an end. As
he defines a mode of development as a technical relationship of
production, and a mode production as a social relationship (Vol. I: 16),
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this is clearly a technological determinist claim (1999, p. 136).
While Castells comments that technology does not determine society, and neither does
society script the course of technological change, the final outcome depending on a
complex pattern of interaction (1996), what Castells presents is still largely a causal
model. It has been a recurrent theme of this effort to question the causal reduction of
social life.
Van Dijk's attack of technological determinism in Castells' work might be raised
against many technology theorists who overemphasize its role in shaping society.
Related to this claim of technological determinism in Castells work, but apart from
Castells' technological determinism, is his causal determinism, which avoids any
questioning of technology in an expansive, ontological sense.

Castells gives no

consideration of what might be the deeper ontological or world-historical dimensions of
technology.
Virilio on the other hand offers a great deal of grounding while examining what is
a deeply historical and ontological question. Despite his metaphysical differences with
Heidegger (Virlio's Christianity versus Heidegger's Nietzschean post-metaphysics), he
shares his tragic, even apocalyptic vision.

In Heidegger's language, inherent to

technology is the potential for man's falling. In Virilio's language, there is the potential
toward the generalized accident.
There are certainly similarities to be found between Castells' and Virilio's
characterization of technology and modernity. Still, the authors think about technology
and modernity in fundamentally different ways. They present different historical and
ontological pictures. The remainder of this section is dedicated to reviewing Virilio's
account of some of the specific technologies of time.
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Virilio and Technologies of Time
In returning to Virilio, our prior review of his work should be kept in mind,
including his war model of society and his grounding in phenomenology. We have
explored both elsewhere, and need not say much more here about these. What is clear is
that Virilio's understanding of modernity is connected to his ontological positions.
Virilio works foremost to suggest that changes in technology may also bring with them
changes in phenomenological being.
We might start with a question raised by Virilio: "The civilization or
militarization of science?" (2000a, p. 1). When thinking of science and technology in
historical terms, where should one start? Modernity is often upheld as a marker of social
change. At the core of this change: a rapid acceleration in productive, scientific and
technological ability. Kem identifies the years of 1880-1919 as important ones; drafted
during these years were a number of technologies having a tremendous social impact.
Yet, these years are representative of a later modernity. Modernity's origins might just as
well be linked to the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century or the Industrial
Revolution of the late eighteenth century.
As we have seen, the changes taking place during the time period roughly
signified as "modernity" had been social as well as material.

Few of today's

technologies are possible without first a mental blueprint (social), and their later physical
construction (material). Still, what exactly is modernity, and when did the historic shift
to modernity take place?

The key word of the previous sentence is shift, which

necessarily signifies an alteration or change from a previous course.
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Recalling Heidegger and his thoughts on when a shift in being occurred, the axis
between Greek culture and Roman Civilization was identified. This shift coincides with
the advent of productionist metaphysics: a new understanding of human being based on
creation, causality and order. Whereas the Greek Heraclitus thought in terms of that
which showed itself, later thinkers and cultural creators would increasingly think in terms
of an instrumental and productionist logic. For Heidegger this is the point in Western
history when the essence of technology began to further reveal itself. But must we start
there? Why not think in terms of an even broader history, along with Spengler:
If we are to understand the essence of Technics, we must not start from the
technics of the machine age, and still less from the misleading notion that
the fashion of machines and tools is the aim of technics.
For, in reality, technics is immemorially old, and moreover it is not
something historically specific, but something immensely general. It
extends far beyond mankind, back into the life of the animals, indeed of
all animals. It is distinctive of the animal, in contrast to the plantwise,
type of living that it is capable of moving freely in space and possesses
some measure, great or small, of self-will and independence of Nature as a
whole, and that, in possessing these, it is obliged to maintain itself against
Nature and to give its own being some sort of a significance, some sort of
a content, and some sort of a superiority. If, then, we would attach a
significance to technics, we must start from the soul, and that alone (1976,
p. 9).
In looking at the soul of technics today, what do we see? We proceed now with
Virilio's account of some of today's technologies of time.

In leading up to this

discussion, we might again remember the question: "The civilization or militarization of
science?" In precise accordance with Virilio's overtly suggestive question, we have the
following historical recount from McKay et al. (1988) that factually summarizes the same
series of events that Virilio alludes to:
Populous, victorious, and wealthy, the United States took the lead in Big
Science after World War Two. Between 1945 and 1965, spending on
scientific research and development in the United States grew five times
as fast as the national income. While large American corporations
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maintained impressive research laboratories, fully three-quarters of all
funds spent on scientific research and development in the United States
was coming from the government by 1965. It was generally accepted that
government should finance science heavily. Similar conditions prevailed
in the Soviet Union.
One reason for the similarity was that science was not demobilized
in either country after the war. Indeed, scientists remained a critical part
of every major military establishment, and a large portion of all scientific
research continued to go for "defense." (McKay et al, 1988, pp. 12051206).
Here we have what is certain to be a historically accurate account of the co
development of science and state defense. This passage illustrates clearly the military
and state driven development of science. The overriding state and military predominance
within the growth of science and technology cuts through any variant of Marxist analysis
that positions a self-governing transnational market (and international class system)
above that of an interested and power wielding state. Given the significance of these
phenomena in the structure and very nature of today's social world, where has sociology
been in their analysis?
Virilio, a non-sociologist by his own admission, has dedicated a large portion of
his work to the examination of such phenomena, but has received only fringe academic
acceptance. With these points made, we might now consider more precisely some of the
hypennodem technologies Virilio identifies and their ensuing time implications.
Across his works, Virilio's account of modem technology might be organized into
at least these five categories:

technologies of transportation, computation,

communication, surveillance, and transhuman genetics-eugenics. The first four of these
have direct time implications, so here is where we will focus. The first four of these are
also highly intertwined. In establishing some coherent way of illustrating the
interconnected nature of these technologies, focus is placed on one of these: video
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surveillance. An attempt will be made to show that from this technology many of the
others branch off, either as components or predecessors.
First, it should be clarified that Virilio' s account of "surveillance" does not follow
the patterns of most of the literature within sociology apart from perhaps Dandeker
(1990), who considers the historical military-bureaucratic origins of surveillance. The
very conception of "surveillance" is an extended one for Virilio. While there are definite
political implications within his work, Virilio attends initially to the phenomenological
dimensions of surveillance. Surveillance in an extended definition includes the concepts
of telepresence and telecommunication. Taken purely as a phenomenon, telepresence
initially exceeds any political or class consideration of who is looking at whom.
Telepresence is the preeminent technology of time for Virilio, for reasons to be explained
here.
Remembering Virilio's concept of dramalagy, from the Greek dramas, a race or
running, we recall that dromology is conceptually tied to speed, distance, space and time.
The transportation technologies of the early 20th century identified by Kem, such as the
automobile, train, and airplane, had certain and direct dramalagical impacts on humanity.
The ability to travel the globe with relative ease has made distance and territory less of an
obstacle for humans. Mobility and logistics are at the heart of warfare, now as well as in
the past. Advances in technologies of transport were essential in the transformation of
military affairs historically.

Speed reduces time traveled, reduction in time traveled

equals readiness, a simple formula. Beyond the traverse of land territory, there is also the
traverse of interaction. The telegraph and telephone were two technologies of modernity
to have increased the rate of interaction among humans. When speaking of "networks,"
as Virilio does, yet in a different tone than Castells, the first network we might identify is
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the network of telephone lines that provide for constant world-wide communication. The
Internet, what was once the Arpanet, a military creation, still largely finds its home in
telephone networks (cable networks as well). The Internet is a combined medium and
source of communication, information, and now perhaps even socialization (with chat
rooms, message boards and the like regularly frequented by adolescents), that is entirely
dependent upon the technology of computation taking place within computers. It is easy
to forget how, without a car, train, plane, telephone or computer, distance is daunting
obstacle for communication and interaction. These technologies bring the far into reach:
If the loss of the inaccessible far reaches is accompanied by media
proximity that owes everything to the speed of light, we shall also pretty
soon have to get used to the distortion of appearances caused by the real
time perspective of telecommunications, a perspective in which the old
line of the horizon curls itself inside the frame of the screen,
optoelectronics supplanting the optics of our telescopes! (Virilio, 1997b, p.
3).
In nearing a consideration of surveillance and telepresence, let us return for a
moment to a conversation raised earlier. The conversation referred to here is the one
between Paul Gsell and Auguste Rodin, who debated the reality of art in comparison to
photography. Which one tells the truth? Neither of course, both are representations; one
directly from a human hand, the other from a mechanical hand.
For the philosopher Schopenhauer, the world was its representation. For
the "video-maker" or electronics expert, we may say, matter is becoming
its presentation - direct and external "presentation" and, at the same time,
internal and indirect presentation, the object or instrument becoming not
only present to the naked eye but remotely present or "tele-present"
(Virilio, 2000a, p. 6).
Important here is this notion of "remotely present" raised by Virilo. How does remotely
present coincide with actually present - and what does it mean to be present? The
phenomenological understanding of human being has its take on this, with origins found
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in Descartes, Kant and Husserl. Its culmination perhaps found in the work of Heidegger.
Merleau-Ponty continued on the phenomenology track, dedicating much effort to
expanding Husserl's conception of the body. The body is present in its location and place
and its being stems from there. Heidegger, preceding Merleau-Ponty, took these matters
up in a slightly different, yet essentially similar manner. Heidegger placed emphasis on
worldliness, and Da-sein, or being-there. If one is remotely present, can one also be
there; be in two places at the same time? We might take a step back and consider what
makes being in two "theres" at the same time a possibility at all.
How can one fail to see here the essential characteristic of video
technology: not a more or less up-to-the-minute "representation" of an
event, but live presentation of a place or an electro-optical environment the result, it would seem, of putting reality on waves by means of electro
magnetic physics? (Virilio, 2000a, p. 1).
Video technology comes only after the first photograph of Niepce in 1826, and
arguably only after Giovanni Battista della Po1ta describes the camera obscura in 1553
(worldhistory.com, 2003, p. 2-3).

Video technology coupled with surveillance

technology and ether floating satellites provides for a world in constant contact. The
political and hegemonic dimensions of all of this radiate, but are set-aside for now.
In further consideration of the direct social time implications of surveillance and
telepresence, we might recall once again Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger's ontological
work on the nature of human being in time. Humans exist in three dimensions of time:
past, present and future.

Husserl spoke of the "thick present," and following was

Heidegger who spoke of time as inseparable from being, or Dasein. Dasein is temporal, a
moving ahead of oneself: "In being futural in running ahead, the Dasein that on average
is becomes itself; in running ahead it becomes visible as this one singular uniqueness of
its singular fate in the possibility of its singular past" (Heidegger 1992, p. 21). Virilio
121

continues and extends this phenomenological brand of thinking to an analysis of the
hypennodem world, in a starkly negative fashion:
By supplanting the "chronological" successively of local times, thanks to
the instantaneity of a universal world time, tele-technologies over-expose
not only all activity, by making it interactive, but also all truth and
historical reality.
Past, present, and future - that old tripartite division of the time
continuum - then cedes primacy to the immediacy of a tele-presence which
is akin to a new type of relief. This is a relief not of the material thing, but
of the event, in which the fourth d_imension (that of time) suddenly
substitutes for the third: the material volume loses its geometric value as
an "effective presence" and yields to an audiovisual volume whose self
evident "tele-presence" easily wins out over the nature of the facts (Virilio,
2000a, 118, bolded text in original).
Here we have reference to tele-technologies and their ability to create a universal
world time while also providing for an instantaneity of interaction across distance.
Losing out here are the volume and relief of the material thing and event. Tele-events
replace space for ether. Truth is also mentioned within the passage above, what might be
its relationship? We've considered the untruth of representations, be they in art or video.
If the intent is imitation, then they are not the real thing, but its representative double.
Virilio is concerned here, however, with another time related aspect of tele-truth. Within
the

context

of

a

modem

world

interconnected by,

and

indeed force-fed

telecommunications, what yields is a truth dependent on the speed of its transmission.
Out from this condition arises the potentiality for accident:
Actually, if the accident is solely what occurs and not like substance,
what is, then the more the local time of history passes and fades, the more
its accident character is revealed, the past few centuries bringing "to light"
the phases of this temporal apocalypse whose probability Epicurus once
pointed out to us (Virilio, 1997b, pp. 123-124, bolded text in original)
In order to realize the potential severity of the integral accident, we need only
consider one monumental accident of telecommunications that epitomizes a number of
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Virilio's concerns related to politics and democratic process. The pre-mature reporting of
the Unites States 2000 Presidential election results was an accident of farcical
proportions. Of course, a winner was eventually declared, but more than once. During
that time of transmission the world received more than one version of truth.

The

presentation of this information would have a serious social impact during the unfolding
of the event, including discouragement of further voting for those watching the "results"
on television. A statistical polling error was blamed, a statistical error indeed, one of
massive proportions, but an accident of transmitted truth as well.
Apart from the political implications of such accidents as the incorrect report of
the 2000 Presidential election results, the phenomenological implications for human
being would seem to be obvious. Below is a final passage from Virilio on time and the
social impact of transport, telepresence and computation technologies:
Here as elsewhere, in our ordinary everyday life, we are passing from the
extensive time of history to the intensive time of an instantaneity without
history made possible by the technologies of the hour. Automotive,
audiovisual and computer technologies are all moving towards the same
restriction or contraction of time ....If time is history, speed is only a
perspectival hallucination that is the ruin of all territory, all chronology.It
is a spatio-temporal hallucination obviously resulting from the intensive
exploitation of kinematic energy whose motor is today the audiovisual
vehicle, as the moving then automotive vehicle was yesterday for kinetic
energy, synthetic images finally replacing the energies of the same name
invented in the last century (2000a, pp. 24-25).
Conclusion
What has been the point of all of this? First, to provide a broad and expansive
world-historical, intellectual and even metaphysical context in which to place modernity.
Why try this? It is easy for modems to forget what has come before; life without the
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telephone, automobile, airplane and personal computer is pre-modem. Their accelerated
use and development characterizes a hypermodem rather than post-modem direction.
Castells' and Virilio's accounts related to time-compression were presented as to grapple
with some of the real technologies of this age and their impacts on the social world.
Further concluding statements follow within the proceeding section.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Time and technology have shared an intimate relationship throughout human
history. It is only through the development of time measuring technologies that human
beings have been able to apprehend duration beyond the experience of light and dark.
The development of technology and science allowed for the further identification of the
earth's twenty-four-hour rotation rate. However, light and dark and even the earth's
rotation rate are not constants. The earth's rotation rate is discemable through science;
science, for instance, can now tell us all we might want to know about how the earth
rotates about the sun. But science explains very little in terms of why the earth rotates
according to a twenty-four-hour cycle. Beyond instrumental function, science offers little
meaning. Nor can science explain the accident of the moon, as interdisciplinary scholar

Jo Ellen Barnett explains:
The quirk of our having a twenty-four-hour day instead of one of some
other length is compounded when we realize that our twenty-four hours is
just a temporary phenomenon. In fact, it is only we humans who have
been dealt a twenty-four-hour day, not our planet. In order to explain this,
we have to take a look at the moon ... Without the moon, the earth would
have evolved into a very different world than the one we know. Instead of
taking twenty-four hours to rotate upon itself, it would now be taking only
about eight hours, and each year would contain 1,095 of those eight-hour
days (1998, pp. 4-5).
These points pertaining to the natural world phenomena of the earth, sun and
moon are made simply to suggest that the human ordering of time and the creation of our
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calendars are largely social phenomena, phenomena intimately linked to the development
of time measuring technologies such as the sundial.
Except for astronomers, no one conceived of dividing the day into twenty
four equal hours until almost three millennia after the first crude
instrument was made for partitioning the day's time. Try for a moment to
erase from your mind these equal hours and ask yourself what you would
have if clocks didn't exist (Barnett, 1998, p. 14).
Following from early technologies of time such as the sundial were the
mechanical clock, the atomic clock, and the socially agreed upon World Standard Time,
or worldwide zone time, according to which our trains, plains and productive lives run.
Taken as a whole, unifying each of the chapters, what has been said? First, that
there are at least two contemporary social investigators with different backgrounds,
methods, and approaches studying the relationship between technology and time.
Second, that social time is and has been at least since the work of Durkheim, a real (yet
hardly explored) phenomenon of interest within sociology. Third, that ones'
intellectual/ontological background is certain to have implications for ones' arguments
related to time.
In comparing Castells' and Virilio's intellectual backgrounds, a great deal of
theoretical and philosophical ground related to time was covered.

Two ontological

positions were identified. One placed focus on the material and commodity aspects of
time, where time is first a valuable resource within a market society (Castells). Another
positioin looked more closely at speed, the history of warfare, and the phenomenological
experience of time within human subjects (Virlio). As reviewed, Heidegger worked to
erase the language of subject and object in showing that time is not only an essential a
priori within individual experience, but also important in how humans, in being-with
others, establish an intersubjective temporality and worldly being (Dasein). Fourth, with
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time clearly established as an essential social thing, we moved next to examine some of
the actual technologies suspected of having an influence on the character of social time.
Once more, technology refers not only to material technologies, but also to social and
cultural technologies such as rationalization and bureaucratization. Through the work of
Kem it was shown that in the past certain technologies had a dramatic influence on the
social character of time. These influences are so obvious that they go without saying.
Without question, the telegraph, telephone, car, train, airplane forever changed the
understanding and experience time. Finally, the work of Castells and Virilio extends this
line of thought and raises the question: if certain technologies of the past have had a
direct influence on our understanding and experience of time, might hypermodem
technologies of today also do the same for the future?
One of the primary objectives of this project as an explicitly theoretical endeavor
was to gain a wide-ranging exposure to a collection of social theorists and ideas. Such
exposure soon crossed over out of sociology and social theory into territories of
philosophy, history and beyond. What became increasingly obvious from the early stages
of this project was that in examining a research question such as technology and time, the
boundaries between social theory, philosophy, history, politics, and even art and
metaphysics could not be so easily drawn. Surely, with a more precise and operational
research question this would not have been the matter it was.
A second aim of this project was to present an argument implicit to the research
question itself: simply that some social things (technology and time being two social
things) cannot be held and studied in a vacuum-like context apart from history or even
the worldview and metaphysical position from which they are examined. If God is in fact
dead (in one's thought), this is bound to have an influence on the way in which one sees
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the natural and social world. One's metaphysical position also often carries along with it
a moral position. And one's moral position is likely as well to have an influence on one's
identification of social problems, social rights and social wrongs.
We might recall Comte's "sociological priests," who through the development of
a positive social science of society were to be the disseminators of correct views and
sociological laws to a people. They were to take the place of the priests of the past and
organize the modem-industrial-world into a harmonious order while solving the social
problems of the day, an altruistic enterprise indeed. Or was it? Comte would have
placed the high priest in his backyard of Paris.
All of this is to argue the point that sociology, even science in a broad sense,
carries along with it important value, meaning and even metaphysical assumptions that
cannot be ignored. How might a positive and causal science address these assumptions?
Can a positive social science operate free from such assumptions, as it strives and claims
to be able to? Such assumptions are certain to shape the very questions of interest to
sociology. To proceed with sociological investigations while blindly ignoring the root
assumptions upon which the "science of sociology" is based is to behave as a social
calculator without a meaning button:

the instrumental function served, the human

function, not.
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